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Abstract
The battlefield of the Nankou Campaign was the earliest battlefield of China’s Second
World War, which covered an extensive area of about 700 km2 on the north west of Beiping at
the border between Hebei and Chahar Provinces. The Nankou Campaign is recalled recently
after being obscured for decades. Unfortunately, without a preservation system like the National
Park Service, the sites in the battlefield, such as the Great Wall, have been left in ruins for over
70 years. A national battlefield program will be required to rescue the sites. This booklet is
created as an interpretation of the history of the Nankou Campaign and its battlefield, in
preparation for the exhibitions and public education once a national battlefield park is established
for the Nankou Campaign.

-1-

Preface
For decades, the Second World War in the Asian-Pacific Theater has been neglected or
misinterpreted. As a result of Mao’s dictatorship in the Chinese Mainland, the Communist Army
was described as the only force fighting against the Japanese invaders before the 1980s. After the
1980s, the truth that the Chinese National Army was the main force of the war started to be
uncovered. However, within the last decade, the government owned media on Chinese Mainland
considered the Chinese National Army as a weak entity who just waited for other Allied Powers'
assistance. This has encouraged, or somehow forced, the other countries to interpret World War
II History from their own perspective instead of an over-all view. The United States could
consolidate its dominant role in the Asian-Pacific without telling much about its ally, the
Republic of China. Japan could deny the invasion of East Asia since China has not explained its
resistance objectively.
Since the distortion of the resistance against the Japanese invasion in the Chinese Mainland
is the origin of the misinterpretation of World War II in the Asian Theater, the mistake cannot be
corrected without a rectification of the WWII history within China itself. As the first campaign in
China’s strategy at the beginning of the war, the Nankou Campaign, which started on August 8,
needs to be interpreted impartially and needs to have the battlefield descriptions preserved to
ensure the accuracy and integrity of the chronology.
Most secondary sources focus on skirmishes starting in July after the Marco Polo Bridge
Incident, and then simply imply that the Songhu Campaign (alias the Battle of Shanghai)
breaking out on August 13 was the first campaign. This booklet contains the historical
background, the situation and condition of the battlefield and some critical sites, and the timeline
of the battles to provide a general view of the Nankou Campaign for readers who are hearing
about this historical event for the first time.
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Introduction
The Marco Polo Bridge Incident was manufactured by the Japanese Army as an excuse to
begin a full invasion all over China, and has been recognized as the outbreak of China’s Total
War of Resistance against Japan, which is informally called “the 2nd Sino-Japan War” in some
source books.
After a series of skirmishes in Beiping and Tianjin, the Japanese forces attempted to take
control of the Beiping-Suiyuan Railroad quickly so that they could move deep into the north
west of China and seize the natural resources. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek could not allow
the Japanese Army to rob Shanxi Province for the coal mines so easily. He sent the Chinese 7th
Army Group, which was under the command of General Tang Enbo, to defend the area around
Nankou along the Beiping-Suiyuan Railroad. Therefore, the Nankou Campaign broke out on
August 8th at the Town of Nankou on the north of Beiping and the battles lasted for 18 days.
The Nankou Campaign was guided by strategy, as the resistance against the Japanese plan
of attack, which aimed at breaking into the northwest of China. It was different from those
skirmishes following the Marco Polo Bridge Incident in July. Though the Songhu Campaign
which broke out on August 13 around Shanghai covered a larger number of troops and a longer
period, it was only guided by the strategy in the south of China and could not change the
situation in the north. As a result, the Nankou Campaign and the Songhu Campaign were the two
principal campaigns respectively leading the warfare in the north and south of China. Moreover,
the Nankou Campaign broke out 5 days earlier, which made it the first campaign guided by the
strategy.
Though China is much more expansive than Japan, it had suffered unrest since the late
Qing Dynasty. When Japan invaded China, the military powers of China were weak and not
unified. China, at that moment, was a giant country, but also debilitated; while Japan had just
equipped its armies with mechanized weapons and became a powerful dwarf.
Relying on the technologically advanced weaponry including bombers, tanks, artillery and
even toxic gas, the Japanese invaders intended to eliminate all Chinese defenses and capture the
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Beiping-Suiyuan Railroad in five days.1 The Chinese 7th Army Group rushed to the front around
Nankou for rescue and engaged the Japanese forces on August 8 when the battles started.
The Japanese Army once believed that they enjoyed overwhelming power, but they failed
to capture Jüyongguan quickly and found it nearly impossible to reach their goal. Even though
the 89th Division of the Chinese Army lost many troops, Jüyongguan never fell to the Japanese.
One week later on August 16, the Japanese troops began to outflank to the west, attempting
to find a weak point and breach the Chinese defense. In return, the Chinese Army also sent
troops to reinforce the defense on the west.
More Japanese troops were transported from Beiping to the front around Nankou. Though
the Chinese Army did not have adequate reinforcements, the soldiers were still holding their
positions. The Japanese could not take control of Jüyongguan and kept moving to the west. On
August 25, the Japanese Army finally found a weak point at Shuitou along the Great Wall, where
the Chinese Army no longer had troops to safeguard. Soon the Japanese troops got through the
mountains and directly moved to the rear of the Chinese defense from Shuitou, guided by the
Chinese traitors. Thus, the Chinese force was almost besieged and the defense of Jüyongguan
became meaningless. On August 26, all Chinese troops began to retreat from the front.

1

Changping District Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultive Conference (CPPCC). Historical
and Cultural Data of Changping District, Volume 5: Nankou Campaign. Beijing: Chinese Literature and
History Press, 2007. 472.
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1 Overview
Title: Nankou Campaign.
Time Period: August 8 – 26, 1937.
Location: Vicinity of the boundary between
Beiping and Chahar,
along the Beiping-Suiyuan Railroad,
Republic of China
Belligerents: Republic of China:
National Revolutionary Army.
Empire of Japan:
Imperial Japanese Army.

Fig. 1.1 Location and area of
the Republic of China, 1937,
Originally by PhiLiP and 白布
飘扬, edit by Benlisquare2

Strength: China: over 60,000 troops. Japan: over 70,000 troops
Approximate Casualties: China: 30,000. Japan: 15,0003
Outcome: The Chinese defense was broken by the Japanese Army; and the
Chinese Army had to retreat.

Fig. 1.2 the two provinces that were engaged in the Nankou Campaign, Hebei (red) and Chahar (orange)

2

Picture from the page of “Republic of China” on Wikipedia, available at:
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Republic_of_China_(orthographic_projection).svg

3

The number of casualties here may not be accurate. There is a whole section discussing the casualties in the
last chapter of this booklet.
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2 Background Information
This section introduces the historical background of the prewar period and early war time
in China, and provides an overview of the historical events which took place in north China right
before the Nankou Campaign broke out. Thus, it is clear that why this campaign could not be
avoided according to the strategies of both the Chinese and the Japanese Armies.
The military background provides the basic information of the military forces of the
belligerents, and briefly shows the differences between the armies of the two countries with a
simple comparison. The tactics in the Nankou Campaign were mainly based on the advantages
and shortages of each army.

2.1 Strategic Background
2.1.1 Beginning of the Second World War
Though the prevalent opinion is that China’s War of Resistance against Japan entirely
started all over the country after the Marco polo Bridge Incident on July 7 in 1937, neither the
Chinese nor the Japanese government had pushed the two countries into a total war within a
short period right after that incident. And no major campaign had broken out within one month
after that incident.4
The Nankou Campaign, which broke out one month later on August 8, 1937, was the first
campaign of China’s World War II5. Though not as huge as the Songhu Campaign (alias Battle
of Shanghai) in number of troops and time period, the Nankou Campaign broke out 5 days
earlier than the Songhu Campaign and was guided by national strategy.
WWII first broke out in China in 1937. The Republic of China was the earliest member in
the four chief Allied Powers (the US, UK, USSR, and China) who fought the Fascists. The first
campaign in the Theater of China should be officially recognized as the first campaign of the

4

Peattie, Mark, Edward J. Drea, and Hans J. van de Ven. The battle for China: essays on the military history of
the Sino-Japanese War of 1937-1945. Stanford Univ Pr, 2010. 27.

5

Mitter, Rana. Forgotten Ally: China's World War II, 1937-1945. New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt
Publishing Company, 2013. Book title.
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entire WWII. To officially recognize this fact, it is necessary to collect, review, interpret all
sources, and analyze the significance and effects of this campaign, after it had been obscured for
decades due to the misinterpretation of the WWII history by Mao’s Communists in the Chinese
Mainland.

2.1.2 Strategic Goals
Japan had been developing rapidly since it completed industrialization in modern time, and
needed additional land and natural resources. Because of its proximity to Japan, China became
the primary target of the Japan’s expansion strategy. Since the late Qing Dynasty, some
European countries, as well as Russia and Japan expanded their powers and obtained many
resources from China by signing on a series of treaties; for example, China made Hong Kong a
colony of Britain and, in addition, had to pay a significant amount of currency in silver ingots to
Britain. As a result of internal revolutions, the Qing Dynasty ended, and military cliques began to
fight each other; China was further divided and became weaker. Japan had planned for a long
time to take advantage of this situation, by attempting to establish an “East Asian Empire” under
its domination.
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Fig. 2.1 Regional Military Cliques during the Warlord Era of China, 19256

Japanese military forces had been increasing quickly since they captured north-eastern
China in 1931, and used that region as their base called “Manchukuo” (Manchuria). After the
Marco Polo Bridge Incident in 1937, the Japanese Army captured Beiping and expected to move
further to the north-west. Aiming at the control of North West China, where abundant mineral
resources existed underground, especially Shanxi Province which was famous for coal mines, the
Japanese Army needed to take control of the Guan Valley through which the Beiping-Suiyuan
Railroad passed. To control this only route of transportation into Shanxi Province, the Japanese
Army had to attack Nankou, Jüyongguan and Badaling in geographical order from the south to

6

Website of the United States Military Academy (USMA or the West Point), available at:
http://www.usma.edu/history/SiteAssets/SitePages/Chinese%20Civil%20War/ChineseCivilWar01.gif
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the north. So Japan sent geographers and investigators spies to build maps in preparation for an
invasion to capture Nankou in a short time / a quick invasion of Nankou.7

Fig. 2.2 Map of the North West China drawn by Japanese, marked with natural resources and productions, 19388

Unexpected conflicts broke out frequently around Beiping and Tianjin after the Marco
Polo Bridge Incident, and diplomatic efforts by Nanjing and Tokyo failed to prevent it from
losing control. According to the situation at the time, the Military Affairs Commission of China
should have been ready to take the risk of declaring war against Japan as a response to its
invasion.
The Military Affairs Commission of China was clear that China was too weak for a total
war at that moment, and could not quickly defeat the invaders with one strike. Instead, China
was obliged to fight an enduring war in contrast to Japan’s “Blitzkrieg-like” strategy. China had
to send armies to defend the area around Nankou. Therefore, in July, 1937, a series of actions
were taken in preparation for the defense of the passage to north west China. The Chinese

7

Chen, Changjie. "Fierce Battles along the Great Wall." Chap. 3 in Recollection of the Former Nationalist
Commanders' Experience during the War of Resistance against Japan - Marco Polo Bridge Incident, by
Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference Committee of Cultural and Historical Data, 166-181.
Beijing: Chinese Literature and History Press, 1986. 174.

8

Newspaper Group, Army Ministry of Japan. Records of Achievenment during the Incident of China. Tokyo:
Army Consolation Bureau, 1938. 140.
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National Revolutionary Army was about to launch a campaign with a strategic purpose at the
national level to prevent the Japanese Army from taking over north west China.

2.2 Regional and Geographical Environment
As it has been mentioned in the historical background, China was divided into regions by
the warlords. Japan had established their base in the north-eastern China since 1931, which was
known as the “three provinces in the north east”, and planned to extend the area under its control.
The Chinese warlords in the north also tried to consolidate their governing in their own regions.
The area around the battlefield of the Nankou Campaign was at a critical position that different
powers were all attempting to capture. This situation created a great hardship for the Chinese
National Revolutionary Army to defend the Beiping – Suiyuan Railroad around Nankou.

2.2.1 Chinese Army: Fighting Enemies on Three Sides Alone
Located at the boundary between the plain and mountains on the north-eastern side of
Beiping, Nankou, which means "the opening at the southern end of the valley", is the first pass
that one would have to face when travelling through the Guan Valley along the railroad. This
area could be threatened directly by the Japanese forces and their puppet troops of Manchukuo
from the north-east, where it had fallen to Japan in 1931. For example, during the Defense of the
Great Wall breaking out in 1933, the Chinese 29th Army was defending at Gubeikou, a few
miles away from Nankou, against the Japanese forces right from the north-east. Being adjacent to
Chahar which was on the north, this area was also threatened by the force of Mengjiang; and the
city of Beiping on the south was rapidly falling after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident. The only
remaining side that was not affected by the Japanese invaders was the Northwest. The Nankou
Campaign was actually an operation on three sides against the intruders.
In this campaign, the Japanese forces and their puppet troops kept attacking Chicheng and
Zhangyuan on the north of the battlefield, while the Japanese main force from Beiping focused
on the front around Nankou and Juyong Pass. The Chinese Army retreated to the west to Yu
County, Guangling and Laiyuan at last.
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Fig. 2.3 The areas around the Battlefield of the Nankou Campaign, showing the Chinese divisions at defense9

2.2.2 Terrain Features
Beiping and Chahar were separated by the mountain ridge. The shortest valley connecting
the two plains was called Guangou (or “the Guan Valley”, since the syllable “gou” means
“valley” in Chinese). Nankou, Jüyongguan and Badaling were the three passes along the valley
from the south to the north. The Beiping-Suiyuan Railroad was right in this valley.
The altitude of most mountains in the battlefield of Nankou Campaign was around 800-900
meters (the ground was about 200-300 meters in the same area), except for some mountains
which were about 1300 meters high.10 The mountains were steeper on the south east sides than
other sides, which was an advantage for the defense against enemies from Beiping on the southeast. However, the Great Wall was built to defend the barbarians from the north in ancient times,

9

This sort of maps of the battlefields are based on the screenshots from Google Earth online map and edited by
the author of this booklet. Other maps of the battlefields in this booklet are created in the same way.

10

Altitudes in this article are based on the data from Google Earth.
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and the defenders could not benefit when they were attacked from the south. Sometimes,
structures of the Great Wall became obstacles for the Chinese defense in Nankou Campaign.11

2.2.3 Climate
The weather changed a lot in the mountains in this area, and the temperature varied from
days to nights. It could be either hot or cold, even in summer. The soldiers at defense sometimes
were required had to walk in the icy water or stay under the scorching sunshine for days, which
might result in disease and injury since the medical condition of the Chinese Army was
extremely poor.
Fogs and rains in the mountains sometimes created opportunities for the Chinese Army to
counterattack the Japanese intruders. The Chinese soldiers could take advantage of the weather
change to slightly balance their inferiority in weaponry, while the Japanese troops were
unfamiliar with the terrains and climate when they first occupied the region.

2.3 Military Units
There is not much available information of the military units in the archives. Those names
of commanders and the structures of the units below divisions were found from the primary
sources, usually records taken down or memoirs written by commanders. Some information is
unclear or incomplete, which is marked with a question mark (?); unsure names of commanders
and titles of regiments are in italic. References can be found in the section of the timeline, where
the titles of military units or the names of commanders are mentioned.

2.3.1 The structure of the Chinese Forces at Defense in the Nankou Campaign
Some abbreviations are created for divisions and armies, such as (c) for “commander”, (v)
for “vice commander”, and (s) for “chief of staff”. The units below divisions only provide the
name of the commanders.

11

Wang, Zhonglian. A Brief Analysis of Strategic Theories and Actual Battles. Taipei: New Culture Press, 1987.
11;
Tan, Ying. Vision of a Drifting Life: Tan Ying's Memoir at the Age of 100. Taipei: Grace Publishing House,
2011. 46.
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Tab. 2.1 Military Units of the Chinese Forces in Nankou Campaign
Main Forces at the Front of Nankou Campaign12

265th Brigade

529th Regiment Luo Fanggui

Li Xian

530th Regiment Tan Naida

267th Brigade

533th Regiment Li Shouzheng13

Lai Ruxiong

534th Regiment Shu Rong

10th Brigade

19th Regiment

Fu Jingfang

4th Division

Ma Liwu

20th Regiment

Liu Hanxing

(c) Wang Wanling
(v) Chen Daqing

12th Brigade

23th Regiment

Ni Zuyao

Shi Jue

24th Regiment

Jiang Dangyi

89th Division
13th Army
(c) Tang Enbo
(s) Zhang
Xuezhong
28,000 troops

Commander: Tang Enbo

(c) Wang Zhonglian
(v) Long Muhan
(s) Wu Shaozhou

61st Brigade
17th Army
(c) Gao Guizi

Cui Zhendong

21st Division
(c) Li Xianzhou
(v) Huang Zuxun

63rd Brigade

14,000 troops

Lü Xiangyun
84th Division

121st Regiment Li Hongci
122nd Regiment Liu Fanggui
123th Regiment Ma Guiheng
124th Regiment Li Shangjing
125th Regiment Zhang Zigeng
126th Regiment Wang Yuantang

(c) Gao Guizi

72nd Division

208th Brigade

415th Regiment Gao Jinbo

Lü Ruiying

416th Regiment Zhang Shuzhen

(c) Chen Changjie
217th Brigade

6000 troops

Liang Chunpu
94th Division

(c) Zhu Huaibing

Independent 7th Brigade Ma Yanshou

433rd Regiment Cao ?
over 5000 troops
4000 troops

Artillery 21st Regiment
Artillery 27th Regiment
Defense of Zhangyuan14

less than 2000 troops

Commander: Liu Ruming

12

Gou, Jitang. Actual Battles of the Chinese 3rd Front during the War of Resistance against Japan. Taipei:
Wenxing Publishing House, 1962. 10-23.

13

Wang 1987, 34.

14

Changping Committee of CPPCC 2007, 312.
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68th Army

143rd Division

(c) Liu Ruming

(c) Liu Ruming

Security Troops of Chahar Province

Reinforcements (had not arrived in time)15

Commander: Wei Lihuang

14th Army

10th Division

(c) Li Mo’an

(c) Li Mo’an

83rd Division

(c) Liu Kan

85th Division

(c) Chen Tie

2.3.2 The structure of the Japanese Attacking Forces in the Nankou
Campaign
Tab. 2.2 Military Units of the Japanese Forces in Nankou Campaign16
11th Division

Commander: Suzuki

1st Division

Commander: Sakai

20t h Division
5th Division

30,000 troops in total

40+ artillery in total

Commander: Kawagishi

10,000 troops

Not Clear

Commander: 1tagaki

Over 25,000 troops

Over 200 artillery

2.3.3 Comparison of Military Forces: Debilitated Giant versus Mighty Dwarf
Tab. 2.3 Comparison of the forces between the Chinese and Japanese Army17
China

Japan

Unification

Only unified in name; armies were previously commanded by
warlords, who became generals of the Chinese Army in the name
of the resistance against Japanese invasion.

Whole country had the
same goal: to take control
of east Asia.

The Training of
soldiers

Training were not regular or strict; most soldiers lacked
experiences for combats; some were college students; only some
of Chiang Kai-shek’s first-class divisions only those sophisticated
soldiers who survived from the interior conflicts between warlords
were better at combats.

Almost all soldiers were
trained regularly, since
the plan of getting the
whole east Asia was
made before the war.

15

Changping Committee of CPPCC 2007, 312.

16

Gou 1962, 7.

17

Gou 1962, 37,38.

- 14 -

Weaponry

Infantry was the main force. The number of artillery was limited.
Only the 89th Division was equipped with weapons bought from
Germany. Other troops were using old rifles that could not reach a
range as long as the Japanese rifles could. Sometimes soldiers
even need to fight with swords when they ran out of bullets. No air
force was available.

Infantry, cavalry and
artillery cooperated with
each other, usually
covered by tanks and
planes.

Transportation and
supplies

The transportation relied on the railroad, which was often
assaulted by the Japanese planes. Food and other supplies were
inadequate, and the medical treatment was poor.

Railroads from Beiping
were not interrupted so
reinforcements and
supplies could be
transported to Nankou.

2.4 Tactics
2.4.1 Tactics used by the Japanese Army while Attacking
The Japanese troops always launched attacks in daytime and stayed in camps in the night.
Usually, they first finished reconnaissance by airplanes since the Chinese Army did not have any
air force, and then bombed the Chinese positions with artillery. At last, the Japanese infantry
covered by tanks moved forward to break the Chinese defense and capture the position.
When the Chinese defenses were too firm to break and the positions were difficult to
capture, the Japanese Army launched toxic chemical bombs.18

2.4.2 Tactics used by the Chinese Army while Defending
Chinese soldiers could fight in both daytime and the night. As the Japanese Army’s longranged weapons could reach a longer distance than the Chinese weapons could, the Chinese
Army was not able to repulse the Japanese attack easily in daytime. However, the Chinese
soldiers were better at fighting in the darkness, so they often counterattack the intruders in the
night time.
The Chinese forces set in-depth positions with multiple layers of defense. Once the first
layer of the defense was broken by the Japanese invaders, the second layer could counterattack
the invaders from the left and right sides. When the Japanese troops was bombing the positions
of the Chinese defense with artillery and planes, the Chinese soldiers hid themselves to let the
Japanese believe that there were no living troops at defense; and when the Japanese infantry
18

Gou 1962, 38,39.
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came close to capture the position, the Chinese soldiers suddenly started to counterattack. Many
Chinese soldiers were skilled in hand-to-hand combats with Chinese war swords. Once they ran
out of bullets or the Japanese troops came close, they jumped out of their positions and fought
the Japanese soldiers with swords. This was probably the last time when swords were widely
used in a modern warfare. 19
Due to the inferior weapons and equipment of most Chinese troops and the shortage of
anti-tank guns or missiles, the Japanese tanks and armored vehicles became a threat to the
Chinese defense. The Chinese Army had to develop a close-combat tactic at a horrible cost of
numerous soldiers’ lives: the Chinese soldiers rushed to the Japanese tanks and threw bundled
hand grenades to the tanks in a close distance; some soldiers climbed onto the tanks and shot
inside with pistols through the viewports/sight ports.20 There is no doubt that the Chinese Army
suffered extremely heavy casualties in the battles against the Japanese tanks.

19

Gou 1962, 38.

20

“Bloody Fights at Juyong Pass (Xue Zhan Juyongguan)”, by Xiao Fang, a journalist of the National News
Weekly of China (Guo Wen Zhou Bao). in Gou 1962, 35.
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3 Introduction of the Important Sites in the Battlefield
The directions described in this section, such as front and back, left and right, are mainly
based on the defense of Chinese Army. Since the Japanese Army already captured Beiping and
was moving to the north, the Chinese Army had to defend in the mountains and fight the
invaders from the south. For the Chinese forces, which were facing the south, the east would be
the “left wing”, and the west would be the “right wing” of their defense; the south was usually
the front, and the north was the rear.
Sometimes, the spelling of the names of one place varied; the pronunciations were usually
similar or the same, while the spelling in Chinese characters could be different. While reading
some primary sources, the readers should notice that the name of the same place may be spelt in
different ways. This was caused by the different dialects spoken by the soldiers and local
villagers.
Due to the constant interior conflicts in the Republican Period, boundaries of the provinces
in China changed very often. The battlefield of Nankou Campaign covered a large area around
the border between Hebei Province and Chahar Province, and many sites at the front were
located along the border. As a result, it is difficult to determine which county or province a site
was located in at that time.
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3.1 Left (East) Wing

Fig. 3.1 Battlefield of the Nankou Campaign – Left Wing

3.1.1 Deshengkou
Deshengkou is located in the north west of Changping District and belongs to the town of
Shisanling which means “the 13 tombs of the imperial family of the Ming Dynasty”. It is 8
kilometers away on the north east of Nankou, as the opening of another valley next to the Guan
Valley.21
In the Nankou Campaign, Deshengkou was defended by the 530th Regiment of the
Chinese 89th Division. The Japanese Army attempted to take control of Deshengkou and get
through the valley, so that they would be able to attack the rear of Jüyongguan. The Chinese
defense was firm since the soldiers fought hard. This Japanese plan of attack failed.22

21

Geographical information is collected from Google Earth Client software, which is also available at
http://map.google.com. Same for the descriptions of other sites.

22

Gou 1962, 12-17.
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3.1.2 Longhutai
Longhutai is a tiny hill in front of the Nankou Pass. The distance between this hill and the
pass is less than 1 kilometer. This sort of situation always brings troubles to the defense: if the
troops defending the mountains at Nankou send a group onto the hill, those troops will be in
great danger due to the tiny size of the hill; but if they simply abandon the hill, the enemy will
probably use it as a base of artillery to bomb the main positions of the defense on the mountains
right behind the hill.
In the Nankou Campaign, the Chinese 529 Regiment had to set a position on this hill. The
troops that were sent to this position suffered terrible casualties in the battles.23

3.1.3 Nankou
The Nankou Pass is located at the southern end of Guangou (or “the Guan Valley”) as one
of the strongholds along the Great Wall of the Ming Dynasty, which now belongs to the
Changping District in Beijing. Anyone who attempts to get through the Guan Valley from the
south to the north has to take control of the Nankou Pass first.
According to the Map of the Republic of China in the war period, the Nankou Town was in
the Chahar Province, which was adjacent to the Hebei Province. In the Nankou Campaign, the
Japanese invaders bombed the Nankou Pass and the Nankou Town numerous times, finally
taking control of both. However, the mountains on both sides of the Nankou Pass were still
defended by the Chinese soldiers, who kept firing at the Japanese troops when they tried to enter
the Guan Valley. The Chinese defense power at this place was the 529th Regiment. The
commander of this regiment, Luo Fanggui, was once reported dead; later he was found badly
injured in the ruins.24 Commander Luo died in the Battle of Taierzhuang one year later in 1938.

23

Gou 1962, 12,13,35.

24

Gou 1962, 12-19.
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Fig. 3.2 Japanese tanks broke into the Nankou Town in August, 1937, provided by the Archives of Changping25

The masonry beacon tower on the east side of Nankou, which was built in the Ming
Dynasty with granite and lime stones, remains in ruin with one of the four corners collapsed. The
foundation of this beacon tower is in a good condition. Thus, though the structure has not been
restored, it is not in great danger.

25

Changping District Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultive Conference (CPPCC). Historical
and Cultural Data of Changping District, Volume 8: the 70th Anniversary of Nankou Campaign. Beijing:
Chinese Literature and History Press, 2008. 23. Also available at the website of Beijing Daily:
http://www.bjd.com.cn/10zdtj/200801/02/t20080102_405992.html
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Fig. 3.3 The beacon tower at Nankou, 2012, by Eric S.

3.1.4 Jüyongguan
Jüyongguan, or the Jüyong Pass (the Chinese syllable “guan” means “pass”), is one of the
most famous and important passes along the Great Wall in the Changping District, Beijing. The
geographical coordinates is 40°17'20.36"N, 116°04'5.72"E. This pass is located in the central
part of the Guan Valley.
Rebuilt in the 1990s, the Jüyong Pass, that people can see today, was and still is known as
the “most magnificent pass.”26 The historic structure, that could have reflected the battles, is no
longer visible.

26

Committee of Geographical Information of Beijing. Local Chronicles of Beijing - Cultural Heritage - Great
Wall. Edited by Mingyi Zhang, Lixing Wang and Bingren Duan. Beijing: Beijing Publishing Group, 2008.
307,308.
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Fig. 3.4 an over view of the Jüyong Pass after rebuilt27

At the time of the Nankou Campaign, Jüyongguan was in the Chahar Province. During the
campaign, Jüyongguan was defended as the most critical fortress by the Chinese 89th Division.
The command center of this division was set under the Yuntai (“Cloud Platform”). After the
Japanese invaders captured Nankou, the Chinese defense around Jüyongguan became the first
front. The Chinese 89th Division defeated the Japanese attacks around Jüyongguan. The
Japanese intruders tried hard to capture Jüyongguan, so they moved to the west to outflank the
Chinese troops at defense and finally broke the Chinese defense at Shuitou. Since the rear of the
Chinese defense was threatened, and since the Japanese troops could have returned to the back
side of Jüyongguan after they got through Shuitou, the defense of Jüyongguan itself became
meaningless. The Chinese forces had to be drawn back from Jüyongguan in order to avoid
unnecessary casualties.

27

Photo from Wikipedia, available at: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/a0/Juyongguan10.JPG
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Fig. 3.5 Ancient gateway at Juyongguan, Great Wall of China, (estimated) 1905--1910, by Sanshichiro Yamamoto.
(from the Hulme collection in Historical Photographs of China, available at: http://visualisingchina.net/#hpc-oh-s02)

3.1.5 Qinglongqiao
The Qinglongqiao Railway Station is on the Beiping-Suiyuan Railroad near Badaling. It
was a key point of the transportation during the war. This railway station is abandoned today.
Before the Nankou Campaign broke out, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek sent several
telegrams to General Tang Enbo to urge him to blow up the railroad and the tunnel around
Qinglongqiao Station.28 During the campaign, the Chinese Army relied on Beiping-Suiyuan
Railroad for transporting reinforcements and supplies from the rear to any places behind
Qinglongqiao. Once the Japanese forces took control of the Guan valley, the Japanese Army
would not be able to transport their troops and equipment in the opposite direction along the
railroad.

3.1.6 Badaling
Badaling is the main pass along the Great Wall at the northern end of the Guan Valley,
which is now located in the Yanqing County. The Japanese Army could attack Huailai and
Zhangyuan after they captured Badaling. Therefore, once the intruders from the south broke the
defense at Badaling, they would face few obstacles on their way to move forward directly into
Shanxi Province in the North West along the Beiping-Suiyuan Railroad. Today, the Badaling

28

Gou 1962, 12.
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pass has become a famous Great Wall park in Beijing that is open to the public since being
rebuilt in the 1950s.29

Fig. 3.6 the Great Wall at Badaling, 200430

In the Nankou Campaign, the Japanese had not even gotten a chance to attack Badaling
from the south since they could not break the Chinese defense at Jüyongguan. After the Japanese
Army outflanked to the west and got across the defensive line at Shuitou, the Chinese troops at
Badaling and Jüyongguan were drawn back.31

29

Committee of Geographical Information of Beijing 2008, 306.

30

Photo from Wikipedia, available at:
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/0f/Great_Wall_of_China_at_Badaling%2C_China%2C_Ap
ril_2004.jpg

31

Gou 1962, 17,18.
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Fig. 3.7 The Great Wall of China at Badaling, 1877, by Thomas Child
(from the National Archives (London) collection in Historical Photographs of China. Available at:
http://visualisingchina.net/#hpc-na01-88)
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3.2 Central Area

Fig. 3.8 Battlefield of the Nankou Campaign – Central Area

3.2.1 Baiyangcheng
The valley starting at Baiyangcheng heading to the west into the mountains is called
Baiyanggou or the Baiyang Valley. The second syllable “yang” varies when written in Chinese.
Baiyangcheng became a village after the war.
In the Nankou Campaign, when the Japanese Army failed to capture Jüyongguan quickly,
it began to send troops to the west. Baiyanggou was the first path they went through, which
connected the eastern part and the central part of the battlefield. 32

3.2.2 Diaominghu
Diaominghu, or the Diaoming Lake (in which the syllable “hu” means “lake” in Chinese),
was a tiny pond in the Baiyang Valley. The lake does not exist anymore but the place has already
got its name.

32

Gou 1962, 15,16.
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When the Japanese Army was outflanking to the west through the Baiyang Valley, the
Chinese Wu Shaozhou Attachment blocked the way around the Diaoming Lake and started a
seesaw battle against the Japanese Army.33

3.2.3 Huanglouyuan
Huanglouyuan is located 12 kilometers away from the Jüyong Pass on the west at the foot
of the Great Wall. The syllable “yuan” means “circle” or “yard” in Chinese, and this place
probably got its name after the shape of the mountains around it. It is sometimes recorded as
“Huanglaoyuan” due to the similar pronunciations. The part of the Great Wall on the mountains
around Huanglouyuan is known as “the Huanglouyuan Great Wall”.

Fig. 3.9 the Great Wall at Huanglouyuan, 2005, by Yang Guoqing

The two mountain ridges on the east and west side of Huanglouyuan are called Dongdaling
and Xidaling. The syllable “dong” and “xi” means “east” and “west” in Chinese, while “daling”
means “large mountain”. As a result, these two places are also known as the “East Mt. Large”
and “West Mt. Large”, or just the “East Daling” and “West Daling”. Due to the different dialects
spoken by the Chinese soldiers (who came from other regions in China) and the local villagers,
the name of Xidaling was sometimes recorded as “Shidaling” or “Shidaoling”.

33

Gou 1962, 13-15,18.
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In the Nankou Campaign, Huanglouyuan was right at the core of the battlefield. The
mountains around Huanglouyuan were a little lower than other mountain ridges, although it was
not a valley. As a result, the Japanese Army attempted to break the Chinese defense at
Huanglouyuan after they failed to capture the Jüyong Pass. The Chinese Wu Shaozhou
Detachment resisted the Japanese Army at Huanglouyuan for days. The Japanese Army failed
again to break the Chinese defense and outflanked further west.34

3.2.4 Hezijian
Hezijian, or the Hezi Ravine (the Chinese syllable “jian” means “ravine” or “stream”), is
located 4 kilometers away from Huanglouyuan on the south. A straight valley connected these
two sites.
In the Nankou Campaign, the position at the Hezi Ravine was defended by the 19th
Regiment of the Chinese 4th Division. For a short time, the Japanese Army broke the defense at
the Hezi Ravine and moved to the north in order to attack Huanglouyuan.35

3.2.5 850 Elevation
Unlike the names of most other places which existed long before the Nankou Campaign,
the 850 Elevation was named after its altitude during the campaign. There is no typical mark for
this site except the height. As a result, the location of this elevation is unsure though it has been
addressed numerous times in different source books. The location in the currently published map
is also questionable.
According to the descriptions of the battles written by the witnesses, the 850 Elevation
should be on the north of the Hezi Ravine and close to Huanglouyuan.36
In the Nankou Campaign, the 850 Elevation was captured by the Chinese and the Japanese
forces alternately many times. When the Chinese 4th Division was too exhausted to hold the
position, the Japanese Army took control of the elevation; but the 416th Regiment in the Chinese

34

Gou 1962, 15,17,18.

35

Gou 1962, 14-17.

36

Gou 1962, 18;
Tan 2011, 53.
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72nd Division repulsed the Japanese force and recaptured the 850 Elevation, which allowed the
Chinese force to keep controlling the area around this elevation for another few days.37

3.3 Right (West) Wing

Fig. 3.10Battlefield of the Nankou Campaign – Right Wing

3.3.1 Changyucheng
Changyucheng, or the Changyu Barracks (the syllable “cheng” here means “barracks”
instead of “city”), is located on the west (slightly south) of Nankou; and the distance between the
two sites is about 20 kilometers. It is in a valley that is 2 kilometers on the west of and almost
parallel to the valley connecting Hezijian and Huanglouyuan. The mountain directly on the north
of the Changyucheng Village is the highest peak along the Great Wall near Beijing at a level of
about 1440 meters above sea level. A watch tower of the Great Wall was built in the Ming
Dynasty on the top of this mountain peak, which has been known as “the High Tower”.

37

Gou 1962, 16-18,20.
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In the Nankou Campaign, the positions were originally defended by the Chinese 4th
Division. The Chinese 72nd Division arrived and took over the defense around August 20.38
At that time, the altitude of the High Tower was reported as 1390 meters, so the mountain
peak was named 1390 Elevation. There were fierce battles around the High Tower in the
campaign. Holes and cracks left by bullets and bombs were still clear to see until 2012, when the
Great Wall in Changping District was repaired. Now the marks of the war have been wiped out,
and the tower standing there is no longer the original High Tower that witnessed that campaign.

Fig. 3.11the High Tower before and after being rebuilt, 2012, by Eric S.

Some local villagers recollected that a Chinese soldier died at the High Tower, holding his
rifle and facing his south west where the Japanese came from. He was probably killed by the
Japanese chemical bombs as his body remained complete with no fatal injuries.39 The so-called
“guerrillas”, which became more famous than the regular armies later in China due to Mao’s
propaganda, often searched the battlefield to gather some weapons from dead soldiers. One
“guerrilla” was trying to grab the rifle from that dead Chinese soldier but got himself killed, for
the dead soldier’s finger was still holding the trigger.40

38

Gou 1962, 20.

39

Gou 1962, 38,39.

40

This is told by local villagers and recorded by Li Guodai of the local government of Changping in the article
“He Still Faced the Enemies”, which requires more proofs. There is a report on the website News of the
Communist Party of China: http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/85037/8377894.html
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3.3.2 Luozijuan
Luozijuan, in which the Chinese syllable “Luozi” means “mules” and “juan” means “pen”,
is located 1.5 kilometers on the west of the High Tower. In the late Qing Dynasty, this area was
used as the pasture to keep mules and donkeys.
In the Nankou Campaign, Luozijuan was defended by the Chinese 4th Division and the
Wu Shaozhou Detachment,41 and the field hospital of the Chinese Army was set at the Luozijuan
Village.42

3.3.3 Laohutou
Laohutou, in which “laohu” means “tiger” and “tou” means “head”, was a position of the
Chinese defense in the Nankou Campaign, located on the west of the High Tower. It was a
critical connection between Changyucheng and Henglingcheng. Now a radio station has been
built at this place.

3.3.4 Zhenbiancheng
Zhenbiancheng, which means “the barracks at the front”, is located 27 kilometers away on
the west and slightly to the south of Nankou. It was also built as an affiliated structure to the
Great Wall in the Ming Dynasty.
In the Nankou Campaign, Zhenbiancheng was in the most western part of the battlefield,
defended by the Chinese 72nd Division.43 The Japanese Army broke the defense at
Zhenbiancheng and moved to the rear through Shuitou.44
The gate of the Barracks, which was the only existing part of this ancient structure, was
rebuilt in 2012. Most building materials on the surface were replaced by new bricks. The historic
exterior was totally gone.

41

Wang 1987, 29.

42

Told by local villagers, more evidences and clues required.

43

Gou 1962, 10.
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Wang 1987, 36.
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Fig. 3.12

Gate of the Zhenbiancheng Barracks before and after rebuilt, 2012, from Panoramio and by Eric. S.45

3.3.5 Henglingcheng
Henglingcheng is another barracks along the Great Wall, which is located 5.5 kilometers
on the north of Zhenbiancheng. The distance between Henglingcheng and Nankou is about 25
kilometers. Now Henglingcheng has become a village. Most parts of the original structures of the
barracks are gone, but the main gate remains complete which is in fair condition.

Fig. 3.13

45

One of the towers of the Hengling Barracks, by Yang Guoqing

The photo on the left, showing the exterior of Zhenbiancheng before rebuilt, is found at Panoramio, available
at: http://www.panommio.com/photo/72427320
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In the Nankou Campaign, the command center of the Chinese 4th and 72nd Divisions was
in Henglingcheng. The battles around this area were fierce because the Japanese Army
continuously sent troops to the west.46

3.3.6 Shuitou
Shuitou is a pass on the Great Wall near Zhenbiancheng, which has been developed into a
village now. The watch towers of the Great Wall at Shuitou collapsed after the war, and have not
been repaired.

Fig. 3.14

The Great Wall at Shuitou, where the Japanese Army passed through the Chinese defense.
Left: provided by the Archives of Changping; Right: by Dr. Shi Yufeng.

By the end of the Nankou Campaign, the Chinese Army did not have any reinforcement.
The Japanese Army kept outflanking to the west and finally broke the Chinese defense at
Shuitou, moving to Huailai, where the Chinese headquarters was located.47

46

Gou 1962, 15-23.
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Gou 1962, 22,23,27.
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3.4 The Rear
3.4.1 Kangzhuang
Kangzhuang, or the Kang Village, is located 10 kilometers on the north-west of Badaling,
which has now become the Kangzhuang Town. The command center of the Chinese 89th
Division was in Kangzhuang during the Nankou Campaign.

3.4.2 Huailai
The original Huailai County was located 20 kilometers on the west of Badaling in the basin,
which was also 22 kilometers on the north of Zhenbiancheng.48 The Guanting Reservoir was
finished in 1954, after which the original Huailai County was submerged under the water. The
new Huailai County was located 23 kilometers on the north-west of the original one, which is not
the historical site in World War II.
In the Nankou Campaign, the headquarters of the Chinese Army was set in the original
Huailai County, where Tang Enbo was developing the strategy and plans for the battles. Since
planes were very rare in China at that moment, the Japanese Army had no worries to send their
planes to bomb the Huailai County before the Chinese defense on the ground was broken.

3.5 Northern Area
3.5.1 Yongning and Yanqing
The towns of Yongning and Yanqing are now located in the Yanqing County, Beijing. In
the Nankou Campaign, these two towns were in the rear of the Chinese defense, garrisoned by
the Chinese 94th Division.49

48

Mr. Qiu Jiang, a reporter of the Da Gong Newspaper, had written an article “Frontline of Nankou”, in which
the description of the location of Huailai met the geographical information provided in Google Earth. Gou
1962, 41.

49

Gou 1962, 10.
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3.5.2 Chicheng
Chicheng, which means “the crimson fort”, is now located in Zhangjiakou, Hebei Province.
It was around 60 to 70 kilometers away on the north of the main battlefield of Nankou Campaign.
The Chinese 84th Division was defending Chicheng against the puppet troops from Manchukuo
and Mongolia during the Nankou Campaign.50

3.6 Withdrawal
The Yu County, as well as Guangling and Laiyuan Counties were the three destinations
where the Chinese forces were supposed to move to after they were withdrawn. Yu County and
Guangling were in Shanxi Province and Laiyuan was in Hebei Province.

50

Gou 1962, 11.
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4 Chronology of the Campaign
4.1 A Preparation against Time
4.1.1.1 July 28 – 29
The Imperial Japanese Army moved their main force forward from the city of Beiping to
the north and deployed around the town of Shahe and Changping in order to consolidate its
control of the entire region around Beiping and Tianjin, which created a desperate situation for
China.51 Meanwhile, the Chinese 13th Army was advanced to Zhangjiakou by General Tang
Enbo, intending to rescue the defense at Nankou. However, Liu Ruming, governor of Chahar
Province, misinterpreted the word "advance" in the message from 13th Army, and blocked the
path so that 13th Army was prevented from moving to Nankou through Chahar. As a
consequence, the 13th Army was delayed to prepare for the defense of Nankou for four days,
which provided the Japanese invaders an opportunity to get well prepared for attacking
Nankou.52
4.1.1.2 July 30
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek sent a telegram to Mao Shuke, telling him to urge General
Tang Enbo to contact Governor Liu Ruming and destroy the railroad at Qinglongqiao, and
demand the 84th Division to assist Tang's troops under the command of General Gao Guizi.53
Lieutenant Colonel Gou Jitang, a staff member of 13th Army, got a message to a contact within
the city of Zhang Yuan, and knowing the situation there, then got back and reported it to 13th
Army on the same day:
General Liu is controlling approximately 20 regiments, whose faith was disrupted by
the invaders with all sorts of tricks such as intimidation and bribery. An army with an
undermined morale would not be efficient in the combat. Our troops also lack strength after

51

Gou 1962, 6.
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Wang 1987, 2.
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Telegram sent by Chiang Kai-shek to Mao Shuke on July 30th, 1937. Changping District Committee of the
CPPCC 2007, 1.
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having stationed separately around Fengzhen and Jining, where few obstacles are available
for a defensive battle.54

General Tang Enbo reported this situation to Generalissimo Chiang. Simultaneously,
General Tang ordered staff Gou Jitang to continue to contact Liu Ruming with polite messages
in order to persuade him to assist the defense of Nankou.55
4.1.1.3 July 31
Chiang Kai-shek sent another telegram to Mao Shuke who was in Taiyuan, asking him to
tell Tang Enbo and Gao Guizi to order their troops to dig wide and deep antitank ditches so that
Japanese tanks and armored cavalries could not get through easily; in addition, Chiang also
distributed 30,000 Yuan to their troops for army provisions.56 On the same day, Chiang sent an
order through telegram to Fu Zuoyi, Governor of Suiyuan Province, to demand him to urge Gao
Guizi to reinforce the city of Zhang Jiakou, and ask him whether he would be willing to
command Tang Enbo's troops.57 Chiang also telegraphed Vice Commissioner Yan Xishan,
asking him to transport Gao Guizi’s 84th Division by train and deploy the troops in
Zhangjiakou.58 Another of Chiang's telegrams was sent to Taiyuan, and turned to Liu Ruming,
explaining the situation of the isolated Chahar Province, due to the fall of Beiping and Tianjin,
and asking him to contact Yan Xishan and Fu Zuoyi to reinforce the defense. In addition, Chiang
stated that all governors in Beiping must be puppets of the Japanese Army since Beiping had
fallen, and again he urged Gao Guizi and Tang Enbo to build fortifications and blow up the
railroad.59
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Telegram Sent by Chiang Kai-shek to Mao Shuke on July 31st, 1937. Changping District Committee of the
CPPCC 2007, 1.
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Telegram Sent by Chiang Kai-shek to Yan Xishan on July 31st, 1937. Changping District Committee of the
CPPCC 2007, 2.

59
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On that same day, July 31st, the 4th and 89th Division of the 13th Army was deployed near
the towns of Jining and Fengzhen except for the troops that were guarding the headquarters.60 A
plan of the 89th Division was set to transport the troops to the battlefront by train. Tang Enbo
arrived in Datong, Shanxi, and deliberated the strategy for the coming battles with Lu Zhonglin,
Gao Guizi, Li Fuying, and other commanders at the headquarters of the 61st Army. Wang
Zhonglian, commander of the 89th Division, Wu Shaozhou, chief of the 89th Division, and Lu
Zhonglin got on board the train together.61
4.1.1.4 August 1
Chiang Kai-shek sent Liu Ruming another telegram and asked him to tell Lu Zhonglin the
importance of the immediate demolition of the railroad at Qinglongqiao and Badaling. The 89th
Division also started to be transported to Huailai and Nankou, when the Japanese air scouts were
detected near the railway.62 Tang Enbo was appointed the highest executive officer of the 7th
Army Group at the front on that day, and he started building fortifications.63 General Tang
ordered his troops to work day and night on the constructions that were supposed to be started on
July 28th. Time was more limited after the construction was delayed by Liu Ruming because of
his interpretation of the word “advance”.
4.1.1.5 August 2
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek telegraphed Liu Ruming again to urge him on the
reinforcement. Liu Ruming, Tang Enbo and Gao Guizi held a confidential meeting at
Guoleizhuang railway station. As Chiang Kai-shek ordered, Liu Ruming was responsible for the
defense within and between the cities of Xianmalin, Shenweitai, and Changyukou64; his main
force should control Xuanhua and Zhangjiakou, and he should also send cavalry to safeguard
60

Report of the Battles around Nankou by the Chinese 89th Division. Changping District Committee of the
CPPCC 2007, 30.
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Dushikou; the 84th Division was responsible for the defense of the area around Chicheng and
Ningjiangbu under the command of Gao Guizi; One division of 13th Army was responsible for
the defense within and between the towns of Jing'anbu, Yongning, Yanqing, and Nankou,
another division would safeguard the area on the north of Shacheng as a reserve force. This plan
was sent to Generalissimo Chiang by telegram. After the meeting, General Lu Zhonglin reached
Zhangjiakou and discussed the strategy and tactics for the coming battle at Nankou with General
Tang and Staff Gou.
Early in the morning on the next65 day, when the train that General Wang Zhonglian
originally took stopped at Xiahuayuan station to add water and coal; nine Japanese aircraft
suddenly came to bomb. The first-class cabin, in which General Wang Zhonglian was supposed
to stay in, was blown to ashes. Fortunately, General Wang got off and made room on his cabin
for General Lu, and General Lu also got off before long. Thus, two Chinese core commanders
occasionally escaped from this disaster.66
This was the first time that the Japanese air force attacked the Beiping-Suiyuan railroad.
Most Chinese soldiers had never seen any planes so they "fled in panic" to take cover, which was
laughed at by the Japanese pilots. In addition to the bombing, the Japanese Army stated that
Chinese force began to deploy their air fighters at Luoyang Airport after being bombed, and
provided 5,000,000 Yuan to the Chinese Communist force to ask them to disrupt the Japanese
forces in Manchukuo.67
4.1.1.6 August 3
Generalissimo Chiang telegraphed an urgent message to Liu Ruming and Tang Enbo,
explaining the importance of recapturing Zhangbei, and ordering them to blow up the railroad at
Qinglongqiao and Badaling so that the Japanese Army would not be able to make any use of it.68
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Separately, Generalissimo Chiang telegraphed Mao Shuke, telling him that 89th Division
temporarily stopped on the west of Chaigoubu and was waiting for the consultation with Liu
Ruming in consideration of Liu's concern about the main force that was marching through his
territory.69
On the same day, the Chinese 89th Division began to take over the defense of the areas
around Nankou and Yanqing from the 29th Army, among which the 529th Regiment replaced
the 4th Regiment in the 143rd Division to defend at Nankou as planned. General Tang issued the
plan for the operation and distributed missions for each division. The 89th Division would
defend along the Great Wall from Nankou to Ningjiangbu as the front line; its headquarters
should be set somewhere between Kangzhuang and Huailai, keeping Shifengshan, Huangyu and
Longkou under surveillance and detecting the activities of the Japanese troops within these areas.
Strongholds should be established at Nankou, Erdaoguan, Manling, Nanshan, Tianmenguan,
Yingpankou, Jing'anbu, etc. And this division should build a stronger defensive line along
Jüyongguan, Nankou, Yongning, Yanqing and Qinglongqiao. In addition, the 529th Regiment in
the 265th Brigade was supposed to garrison at Nankou, Jüyongguan, Sulinkou, Tangyukou,
Guangongling, and other places nearby. with the assistance of one engineering company; 530th
Regiment with the exception of one battalion would garrison at Deshengkou; a battalion in the
530th Regiment would safeguard Qinglongqiao under the command of the 265th Brigade; the
267th Brigade lacking the 533rd Regiment would defend at Yanqing, Yongning, Jing'anbu, etc.
with the cavalry company. The 533rd Regiment would be the chief reserve force, defending at
Kangzhuang. Men Changchun, commander of the engineer battalion, would command a
company to defend the mountain pass on the south of Chenjiabu and monitor Baiyangcheng. The
independent group of the division would garrison at Yulinbu on the south of Kangzhuang.
General Wang Zhonglian deeply sensed that the mission would be arduous, so he carefully
observed and studied the terrain of this area so as to make a prudent plan.70
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4.1.1.7 August 4
Generalissimo Chiang told General Tang on the phone that the Japanese Army would first
attack the area around Nankou with all its strength. He hoped that General Tang's troops would
finish the fortifications soon because he was also anxious about the enemy threatening Rehe
Province.71 As Generalissimo Chiang had predicted, the Nakatomi Squadron of the Japanese Air
Force would bomb the armored trains of the Chinese 84th Division near Huailai and
Xiahuayuan.72
On that day, the military order distributing missions was transmitted to every regiment
from the headquarters of the 89th Divisions in Huailai; and each regiment defended at its own
position according to the mission. Commander Wang Zhonglian, vice commander Long Muhan
of the division, and Chief of Staff Wu Shao Zhou investigated the terrain at Nankou and the
mountains around it. Based on the differences of the condition of the equipment between the
89th Division who had just arrived and the 29th Army who had previously garrisoned at the
same place, General Wang modified their tactics, making a more narrow front at Nankou and
defending at the top of the mountains on the east and west sides of Nankou. After inspecting the
terrain around Jüyongguan and Qinglongqiao, he also decided to implement an in-depth defense
relying on the complicated terrain. At night, scouts of the 89th Division reported that a large
group of Japanese infantry and cavalry in Changping were forcing the local Chinese villagers
and citizens to construct the highway connecting Shahe and Changping; thousands of Japanese
troops in Shahe, consisting of infantry, cavalry and artillery, also forced local civilians to build
the highway between Shahe and Yangfang. Meanwhile, the Japanese Army was transporting its
troops from Beiping to Shahe, and seven tanks in Shahe were moving forward to Changping.
General Wang immediately noticed that the Chinese defense was weak on the right (west) wing,
where there was a higher risk of being outflanked; so he slightly moved the defense to strengthen
the right wing.73
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4.1.1.8 August 5
In the morning, General Wang went to Yanqing to review the terrain, and the construction
of fortifications; then he went to Yongning to inspect the defense of the 534th Regiment,
returning to the headquarters at Yulinbu in the rain in the afternoon. In the evening, he discussed
military plans with the staff members, developing flexible tactics to overcome the enemies'
attack.74 In their efforts to control the Beiping-Suiyuan railroad, the Japanese invaders urgently
required a battle to break the Chinese defense in this area.75
4.1.1.9 August 6
Generalissimo Chiang clarified the strategic significance of Zhangbei to Lu Zhonglin, and
ordered him to urge General Tang Enbo and Governor Liu Ruming to regain the control of
Zhangbei immediately and blow up the railroad between Qinglongqiao and Nankou;76
simultaneously, Generalissimo Chiang asked General Tang about the construction of
fortifications at the front, and reminded him that the Japanese Army would vigorously attack
Nankou soon, ordering Tang to focus on the western side of the Beiping-Suiyuan Railroad and
wait for the significant reinforcements which would arrive within half a month.77 Before getting
a response from General Tang, Generalissimo Chiang telegraphed General Tang to remind him
to keep an eye on the enemy in Rehe and Duolun, and regain Zhangbei after assembling together
with Li Xianzhou’s 21st Division and Zhu Huaibing’s 94th Division. Over 200 Japanese cavalry
troops were patrolling near Shahe, and more troops were joining in.78
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4.1.1.10 August 7
Generalissimo Chiang telegraphed General Tang, suggesting that he should make “dummy”
sites around the real positions, so that the Japanese air scouts would be confused and their
reconnaissance would be disrupted; real positions should be camouflaged among the dummy
sites.79
Groups of Japanese mechanized forces were transported from Beiping to Nankou,
including 30 tanks and 8 artillery teams; their cavalry groups engaged the Chinese defense
several times and were repelled. Generalissimo Chiang was aware of the upcoming attack on
Nankou by the Japanese Army, so again he commanded General Tang to blow up the railroad
and tunnel at Qinglongqiao, and ordered him to report the status of Nankou to the National
Military Commission.80
The Chinese 89th Division centered its headquarters in Yulinbu, focusing on the defense in
Yanqing, Chikou, Qinglongqiao, and Jüyongguan; a scallop-shaped telephone network was set
up within that day between all locations. That network provided an unimpeded communication
system without any interruption during the entire campaign until the Chinese Army retreated at
the end.
Li Xian, commander of a brigade, reported to General Wang Zhonglian that the Chinese
Army at the front had already engaged the Japanese force. General Wang returned to
Jüyongguan to direct the battle as soon as he heard of this message. The Japanese invaders began
to harass the Chinese defense with cavalries and artilleries at Deshengkou, Longhutai,
Dahongmen, Nankou and other nearby places. Japanese air fighters also came to bomb the
Chinese fortifications with small groups of three to five at Jüyongguan, Kangzhuang, Huailai,
and some other places. The Chinese soldiers defended hard against the invaders, “同仇敵愾”.
The invasion was repelled this time. General Wang figured out that the Japanese troops only
came to explore the power of the Chinese defense on that day, and he believed that there would
be a fierce battle on the next day. Thus, he set the command center at Jüyongguan and ordered
his troops to build fortifications quickly, moving the train of supply forward to the Qinglongqiao
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railway station; Yulinbu was set as the headquarters at the rear of the 89th Division, responsible
for the contact between Huailai, Yanqing, East and West Daling, Diaoming Lake, Huanglouyuan
and nearby places.81 The 529th Regiment was famous for its brave and bold warriors, so it was
responsible for the defense at the first front line in this campaign; the Commander Luo Fanggui
sent the first battalion to defend at the town at Nankou and its right (west) wing; the 2nd
Battalion was sent to defend Longhutai and the left (east) wing of Nankou; and the 3rd Battalion
was the reserve force of the regiments, safeguarding the railroad. Hundreds of Japanese
horsemen invaded the city of Changping and sneaked to Longhutai with over 20 armored
vehicles for harassment and reconnaissance. Commander Luo anticipated that the Japanese force
must head to Huyu Village in front of Nankou, so he urged his 2nd Battalion to remain alert.82

81

Wang 1987, 16,17.

82

Wang, Zhonglian. Recollection of the Military Expedition. Vol. IV. Taipei: Wang Zhonglian, 1978. 4013.

- 44 -

4.2 Fierce Fighting for Eighteen Days

Fig. 4.1 the main Battlefield of the Nankou Campaign, showing the movement of the armies and locations of
critical sites

4.2.1 The Contention for the Control of Nankou and Jüyongguan
4.2.1.1 August 8
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek telegraphed General Tang and other core commanders to
supervise the defense preparation. The Japanese Army began to transport troops from Nanyuan
to Changping by army lorries to attack the left (east) wing of the Chinese defense line.83 The
Nankou railway station, Longhutai, and Dahongmen were the earliest to be affected, being
bombed by Japanese artillery and air force; the Chinese guards calmly evacuated from the
defense and hid themselves at the back side of the mountain slope while the Japanese force was
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bombing; the guards were waiting for an opportunity to intercept the Japanese who came close.
Therefore, the fortifications were damaged but the Chinese force only suffered slight casualties.84
Simultaneously, about 500-600 Japanese horsemen with over 10 canons attacked Deshengkou.85
The Chinese 530th Regiment fought hard to resist under the command of Tan Naida, killing 5 of
the Japanese invaders and injuring 8 of them before they retreated. The Chinese force suffered 11
casualties. The Japanese invasion on that day still seemed to be an exploration to determine the
power of the Chinese force. In coordination with harassment, the Japanese invaders launched
bombing raids and sent scouts to attack Guo Lei Zhuang and Chaiguobu, aiming at attacking the
Beiping-Suiyuan railroad secretly; they were repulsed by the railway guards under the command
of Governor Liu Ruming.86 August 8th has been considered as the beginning of the official
Nankou Campaign.
4.2.1.2 August 9
At dawn, 5000 meters away in front of the Chinese defense, Japanese armored vehicles
provided a cover for their engineers who were building the bridge. The Chinese Army repelled
the Japanese troops several times; meanwhile, groups of Japanese troops harassed Huyu and
Erdaoguan. With the assistance of an artillery regiment and several armored vehicles, Japanese
Suzuki Multi-brigades attacked the Chinese at Nankou and Guangongling, then ground-strafed
with 20 air scouts. The Chinese 529th Regiment fought effectively and defeated the invaders.87
At noon, over a thousand Japanese troops with artillery and armored vehicles arrived in
Changping; another thousand troops consisting of infantry and cavalry were prepared to attack
the Chinese Army in three different routes. One group had already moved forward to Nankou
and forced Chinese residents to build the highway from Changping to Yangfang. It was raining
and roads were muddy. The Japanese vehicles were trapped in the mud 10 kilometers away from
Changping to the west. They forced the Chinese civilian residents to help get the Japanese
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vehicles out of the mud, and the attack was suspended. The Chinese Army took this opportunity
to attack the Japanese from the rear, to enhance their fortifications and camouflage, and to
upgrade equipment for contact. At 3:00 p.m., over a hundred Japanese cavalry troops raided
Longhutai; the Chinese troops resisted for three hours. The Japanese Army sent more troops to
reinforce, and the battles became fierce.88
In the night, over 400 Japanese cavalry outflanked the Chinese from Baiyangcheng to the
west, and attempted to break the Chinese defense at some point between Sulinkou and
Zhenbiancheng to attack their target of Huailai. Wu Shaozhou, chief of staff of the Chinese 89th
Division, commanded a reorganized detachment, which consisted of the engineering battalion of
the 89th Division, Liu Hanxing's Regiment in the 4th Division, and the 564th Regiment in the
94th Division, with 2 machine guns from the 533rd Regiment. These troops moved through East
Daling, Diaoming Lake and Shidaoling, to resist the Japanese troops that were attacking
Baiyangcheng.89
4.2.1.3 August 10
Generalissimo Chiang sent a telegram to General Tang, urging him to destroy the tunnels
along Badaling and Qinglongqiao and make sure that the restoration of the tunnels would take
more than one year. He also reminded General Tang to get prepared to keep the troops safe from
toxic gas launched by the Japanese Army, and to ensure the troops equipped with gas masks
were able to practice.90
At dawn, the Japanese Army with more than 10 cannons sent thousands of cavalry troops
to the town of Nankou and the railway station, and the battle lasted for four hours; Huyu Village
also suffered an onslaught. At 1:00 p.m., buildings and strongholds at Nankou were totally
destroyed; Huyu Village was captured by the Japanese Army, but the mountains behind it were
still under the control of the Chinese Army. The Japanese Army then sent over 500 cavalry
troops to attack the Nankou railway station again; the Chinese defense troops fought hard to
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resist, suffering heavy casualties. In order to avoid unnecessary casualties, the 6th Company of
the Chinese 529th Regiment, which was the only force guarding at Nankou, was obliged to be
drawn back to the main front, and the Nankou railway station fell. Simultaneously, at
Kanglingjian and Erdaoguan on the north-east of Deshengkou, the Chinese troops repelled the
enemy several times.91
Also on August 10th, at Shidaoling, the Chinese force commanded by Wu Shaozhou
engaged the Japanese invaders at dawn. Both Chinese and Japanese forces suffered heavy
casualties there, but the Japanese force was reinforced by more troops arriving at 1:00 p.m.
Although the Chinese soldiers were not afraid of death at all, they were outnumbered by their
enemy. Shidaoling fell; the Chinese force retreated to Diaoming Lake, and continued the
confrontation against the Japanese. The Japanese invaders bombed Diaoming Lake with cannons,
relying on their advantage of firepower, and then assaulted the town with infantry; both attacks
were repelled. At 4:00 p.m., the Japanese invaders sneaked to Huanglouyuan. Chief of Staff Wu
Shaozhou sideswiped and defeated these invaders from West Daling with the 4th Company of
the 3rd Battalion in the 20th Regiment in 4th Division under his command. Then he ordered his
troops to build fortifications at Diaoming Lake and Huanglouyuan, keeping the Japanese troops
at Shidaoling under surveillance.92
The Chinese 529th Regiment counterattacked the Japanese troops who had just captured
Nankou but had not yet stabilized it. Nankou was controlled by the Chinese force again after 3
hours. After days of successive attacks at every Chinese stronghold from the left to the right, the
Japanese force was increasing in number, and the attacks became actual operations rather than
exploring the size of the Chinese defense. General Tang Enbo went to the command center of
89th Division at Badaling from Huailai, and then to Jüyongguan to inspect the terrain with
General Wang Zhonglian. In addition, the Chinese troops placed defensive mines in front of their
positions under General Tang's supervision, in case of the breakthrough of Japanese tanks.93
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At 7:00 in the evening, the 2nd company of the Engineering Battalion of Chinese 89th
Division arrived at Diaoming Lake, monitoring the Japanese force at Yangfang.94
4.2.1.4 August 11
At dawn, the Suzuki Division of the Japanese main force launched a mass attack on
Nankou with over 2000 infantry and cavalry troops, more than 20 cannons, and 9 air fighters and
bombers; another group of over 1000 troops with over 10 cannons attacked Deshengkou at 11:00
a.m.;95 but both failed. In the afternoon, the Japanese division reinforced with over a thousand
troops, attacked Huyu Village and Longhutai with armored vehicles, but was repelled by the
Chinese defense power. The Japanese airplanes bombed again, and the Chinese soldiers
struggled against the Japanese infantry and cavalry with their swords; this melee occurred over
10 times. At 3:00 in the afternoon, while the Japanese Army sent dozens of cavalry troops to
assault Mabaoquan and Diaoming Lake, they were forced to retreat from Nankou, Huyu Village,
Erdaoguan, and Deshengkou by sunset. The Chinese Army held their position and confronted the
Japanese force. The Chinese Army suffered over 300 casualties, and the casualties of Japanese
Army were double.96
Guanziling had become a stronghold of the Chinese defense that the Japanese Army
needed to control because of its higher altitude than the surrounding area. Since August 9th, the
Japanese bombed this area with thousands of artillery shells to destroy the fortifications.
However, the 529th Regiment of the Chinese Army held its position and seriously repelled the
Japanese invaders, which was "really parallel to the eight hundred warriors' heroic behavior in
defending the Sihang Warehouse in October within the same year (1937)."97
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Early in the morning on the same day, General Wang Zhonglian ordered Wu Shaozhou to
counterattack Shidaoling with his detachment around Diaoming Lake before the fog lifted.98 The
3rd Battalion in Commander Yang Chao's 20th Regiment of the Chinese Army attacked
Shidaoling from Huanglouyuan. At 9:00 in the morning, the two sides engaged each other;
despite the heavy casualties, the Chinese warriors, due to their boosted morale, killed many
invaders in the battle. Unfortunately, after Commander Yang sacrificed himself, the Japanese
troops in Baiyangcheng came to reinforce, and the Chinese force was outnumbered. Thus, Wu
Shaozhou had no choice but to draw his detachment back to recover. To consolidate the defense
between East and West Daling, Chief of Staff Wu Shaozhou sent the engineering battalion to
safeguard Diaoming Lake, and Liu Hanxing's Regiment of the 4th Division to defend the main
stronghold at East and West Daling. The Chief of Staff then sent another group to establish a
stronghold at Huanglouyuan and contact Fu Jingfang's Regiment of the 4th Division. All troops
were required to build and strengthen the fortifications at night.99
A couple of days had passed since the campaign broke out. Staff Officer Gou Jitang
concluded:
all battles had broken out at the front of the 89th Division, the left (east) wing of the
Chinese defense line, over the last few days; the 4th Division was responsible for the defense
of Huailai; the 84th Division had not engaged in fierce battles, yet; General Zhu Huaibing,
commander of the 94th Division telephoned on 11th: "The first group of his division is
approaching Guoleizhuang, and the rest of the troops are supposed to get through Datong."
The battles today further clarified that the campaign had entered an important stage. General
Tang issued a message to encourage all soldiers in his army:
1. The campaign has officially started after fighting for four days. All compatriots should be
clear about our responsibilities to serve our nation. Regardless of the enemy's
overwhelming firepower, we ought to fight to the last stand in our position to manifest our
gallantry and integrity.
2. All soldiers and commanders shall be rewarded for their achievement and punished for
their mistakes; the ones who flinch shall be executed immediately.
3. Commanders at all levels should set good examples with their own behaviors and
encourage their soldiers in proper ways.
4. Major Commanders should always keep an eye on the enemies' movements and attack
them before they realized that they were being watched. It is better to attack them
unawares, especially in the night. Thus, we can expend fewer troops.100
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4.2.1.5 August 12
At 7:00 a.m., the Japanese Army sent another 5,000 infantry, 50-60 artillery, and 20-30
armored vehicles to launch a comprehensive attack on the areas around Deshengkou, Huyu,
Nankou, and Sulinkou in coordination with their air force; this created the fiercest battle by that
day, in which both sides fought for the position six times. Simultaneously, the main force of the
Japanese Army mobilized and outflanked to the right (west) wing of the Chinese defensive
position: one group came to assault Baiyangcheng, Jiugang, and Hezijian with a combination of
over 1000 infantry and cavalry, confronting the 19th Regiment of the Chinese 4th Division and
starting a battle; another group of about 2000-3000 troops moved forward along Mentougou and
Qingbaikou to Mahuangyu. General Wang Zhonglian sent Chief of Staff Wu Shaozhou to
supervise the battle around Sulinkou and Henglingcheng.101
At 3:00 in the afternoon, 20 Japanese armored vehicles broke into Nankou, and at the end,
an entire platoon of the Chinese Army had fallen in the battle.102 By 8:00 p.m., the Japanese
Army had taken over control of Nankou.103 General Wang ordered the 529th and 533rd
Regiments to wait for an opportunity to counterattack. In the evening, the Chinese force
destroyed 6 Japanese tanks with antitank guns when the tanks could not move in darkness.
Commander Luo of the 529th Regiment led the 7th and 9th Companies of the 3rd Battalion of
the regiment fought hand-to-hand combat against the Japanese invaders, killing over 200
Japanese soldiers104 with swords. Long Guiquan, the commander of the 7th Company, sacrificed
himself in the battle, and few soldiers of this company survived. The Japanese intruders were
still not able to break through the defense around Nankou. The Chinese Army had their morale
boosted despite their heavy casualties of over 1000.105
At about 12 o'clock midnight, over 20 trains arrived at Nankou from Changping, carrying
Japanese troops of the Sakai Combined Brigade; these troops disembarked at Nankou, and
started to attack the Chinese military positions. Meanwhile, the Japanese Army kept transporting
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ammunition and the wounded between Changping and Nankou with lorries. The Chinese scouts
found that the Japanese Army was mobilizing 70-80 heavy artillery and dozens of vehicles at the
Nankou railway station; unfortunately, the Chinese Army did not have long-range artillery or a
powerful air force. So there was nothing the Chinese Army could do to destroy these mechanized
Japanese troops but to keep alert and wait for a chance when the Japanese invaders got close.106
During the desperate battle, General Tang sent General Wang and Commander Luo a
telegram: "We are responsible for the survival of our nation. Now it's the time for us to take our
revenge on the enemies with our blood..." The Chinese soldiers were encouraged by the
General's words and dedicated their lives to the battle against the Japanese invaders.107
General Tang sent a brigade in the 4th Division to defend at Henglingcheng under the
command of General Wang Wanling, the commander of Chinese 4th Division, in case the
Japanese Army outflanked to the right (west) side. These troops got ready to intercept the
invaders from Baiyangcheng and eliminate them in front of the Chinese defensive positions in
coordination with the Chinese 89th Division. General Wang Wanling sent the 10th Brigade
under the command of Ma Liwu to intercept the enemy at Hezijian; the 3rd battalion of 19th
Regiment in the 10th Brigade fought against the Japanese force at Jiugangban, Hezijian for half a
day, repelling 600-700 invaders backwards a few kilometers, which slightly reduced the threat
on the right (west) wing of the Chinese defense.108 On the same day, Liu Hanxing's Regiment in
Wu Shaozhou's detachment only found the Japanese cavalry moving and did not engage in a
firefight.109
4.2.1.6 August 13
In the night between August 12th and 13th, two trains of Japanese troops reached Nankou
and kept attacking the Chinese defensive position around Nankou as soon as they
disembarked.110 Before dawn on the 13th, over 500 Japanese infantry covered by over 10 tanks
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broke into the town of Nankou. The Chinese 89th Division resisted several times, shooting the
invaders with machine guns from the mountains on two sides of Nankou. The Japanese troops
could not get any further. At dawn, over 200 Japanese infantry and cavalry harassed (attack)
Kanglingjian and were repulsed; at 9:00, the Japanese air force dropped more than 10 bombs at
the Chinese positions in Deshengkou. From 10:00 in the morning, the Japanese artillery bombed
Nankou again for five hours with over 5000 bombs, but their attack was still repelled by the
Chinese defensive power with machine guns and hand grenades. The Chinese Army suffered
terrible casualties. The 533rd Regiment of the Chinese Army come to reinforce at 3:00 p.m. and
started to consolidate the fortification on the mountain on the right (west) side of Nankou.111
Although the Chinese 529th Regiment defeated the invaders over a few days, it was getting
exhausted in number without reinforcement but still maintained its position. General Tang sent a
telegram to encourage all commanders and soldiers in his army:
Brother Luo Fanggui of the 529th Regiment, you are leading your regiment to defeat
overwhelming enemies for days, inspiring the entire Chinese Army and having created a
positive condition for our final victory. The control of Nankou will influence whether we
will be successful in our national war of resistance against Japan; although the enemies are
cruel, relying on their overwhelming weaponry, they cannot destroy all our positions in this
area. Our advantages are our braveness and boldness instead of high-quality weaponry, so
we cannot leave our positions when we are alive, not even a step. Our lives can be hardly
longer than 100 years before we die; real heroes should die on the battlefield for the glory of
a warrior. Please encourage all soldiers to struggle for our victory!
General Wang Jieren (Zhonglian) of the 89th Division, Commander Li Xian's brigade
in your division defeated the enemies several times over these days and we are closer to the
victory, which is inspiring news! Our nation will be saved by our sacrifice; otherwise, it will
fall, owning to our cowardice; so we have to fight to the death to defend our positions
without the hope of survival.112

The Chinese soldiers figured out the regular pattern of the Japanese attack. When the
Japanese artillery and air force bombed the positions, the Chinese soldiers moved back and took
cover in the terrain; when the Japanese troops got close, the Chinese soldiers counterattacked
with machine guns and hand-grenades, or even blades/swords sometimes. The Chinese soldiers
in the 529th Regiment struggled for their lives but no one had expected to survive; those who got

111 Report of the Battles around Nankou by the Chinese 89th Division. Changping District Committee of the
CPPCC 2007, 36.
112 Gou 1962, 15.
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light injuries soon came back to their positions and continued to fight after simply having their
wounds bandaged.113
The Japanese Army was still failing to capture Nankou in spite of their overwhelming
firepower from their artillery and air force. They outflanked to the right (west) wing of the
Chinese defense, attempting to find a weak point near Henglingcheng where they could break
through. The Japanese troops attacking Huanglouyuan and Diaominghu were repulsed by the
20th Regiment in 10th Brigade of the Chinese Army. But another 1,000 Japanese invaders from
Baiyangcheng outflanked to Gaoyakou, moving to Mabaoquan for an invasion. The Chinese 20th
Regiment was obliged to return to defend Hezijian.114 In the evening, the Chinese 89th Division
drew back the engineer battalion from Wu Shaozhou's detachment and sent it to demolish the
railroad between Jüyongguan and Qinglongqiao, since the situation around Nankou was
becoming worse. Liu Hanxing's Regiment took over the defense of the position of Wu
Shaozhou's detachment.115
On that day, the Songhu Campaign broke out in Shanghai. The Japanese Army, Navy and
Air Force fiercely attacked Shanghai. Generalissimo Chiang could no longer focus on the north,
so he telegraphed Fu Zuoyi, ordering him to recapture the north of Chahar and assist General
Tang Enbo to defend the area around Nankou.116
4.2.1.7 August 14
The leading troops of Li Xianzhou's 21st Division arrived at Kangzhuang; Zhu Huaibing's
94th Division arrived in Yongning and Yanqing, reinforcing the defense at the battlefront.117
Generalissimo Chiang also telegraphed General Tang, telling him that three divisions were on
the way to reinforce the defense around Nankou from Laiyuan in Yi County under the command

113 Gou 1962, 15.
114 Gou 1962, 15.
115 Wang 1987, 27.
116 Telegram Sent by Chiang Kai-shek to Fu Zuoyi on August 14th, 1937. Changping District Committee of the
CPPCC 2007, 8.
117 Wang 1987, 9.

- 54 -

of General Wei Lihuang, and asking General Tang to boost the morale to hold their position and
wait for the reinforcements.118
On that day, over 100 Japanese artillery kept bombing the mountains on the left and right
side of Nankou for 7-8 hours, destroying the fortifications of the Chinese defense. Later,
Japanese infantry and tanks attacked the position of the 1st battalion of the Chinese 529th
Regiment on the right (west) side of Nankou under the cover of their air force, but failed. Soon,
dozens of Japanese tanks attacked Nankou, breaking through the Chinese defense power's
position with an overwhelming number of troops. The Japanese troops got close to Jüyongguan
along the highway, threatening the rear positions of the Chinese defense power. Fortunately, the
in-depth positions of the Chinese Army around Jüyongguan were extraordinarily sturdy, and the
Chinese soldiers fought hard against the invaders; the invading Japanese troops were repulsed.
Both armies suffered heavy casualties. After dusk, the Japanese Army had its reinforcement
transported by two trains from Beiping.119
Another group of Japanese invaders was defeated at Henglingcheng; they retreated to
Baiyangcheng and then moved to Mabaoquan together with their reinforcement from Gaoyakou,
attempting to attack the Chinese position at Hezijian. But due to the diversionary actions of the
Chinese 4th Division, both armies were contained at Shidaoling with no further progress.120
The situation of the Japanese Army around East and West Daling did not change on that
day; the 10th Brigade of the Chinese 4th Division was responsible for the defense in this area
under the command of Ma Liwu. General Wang Zhonglian of the Chinese 89th Division drew
back Chief of Staff Wu Shaozhou to Kangzhuang, and commanded Liu Hanxing's Regiment in
the 21st Division and the 564th Regiment in the 94th Division to defend at Zhenziling and
safeguard the 15-kilometers gap between East Daling and Yangjuanzi. At night, the Chinese 89th
Division came out to attack the Japanese troops in the area between Nankou and Jüyongguan.
After more than 10 strikes, they annihilated over 430 Japanese intruders, seized 32 heavy
machine guns, and destroyed 5 Japanese tanks.121
118 Telegram Sent by Chiang Kai-shek to Fu Zuoyi on August 14th, 1937. Wang 1987, 27.
119 Wang 1987, 20,21.
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4.2.1.8 August 15
By this day, the Chinese 89th Division had inflicted heavy casualties on the Japanese
intruders over night; then they got a chance to drive the Japanese intruders out of Nankou and
prepared to counterattack the intruders on the mountains beside Nankou. However, a Japanese
regiment suddenly came to reinforce; the Chinese force was outnumbered and had to head back
to defend at its positions. All regiments in the 89th Division suffered terrible casualties in this
battle, especially the 529th and 533rd Regiments. Survivors still had a strong desire to fight in
order to avenge.122
The Japanese also complained about their hardship in this battle, emphasizing that the
terrain at Jüyongguan was a natural barrier. However, it is not all correct. The ancient
fortifications at Jüyongguan were built to defend against the north and had no advantage when
facing to the south; moreover, since the Japanese Army came to attack Nankou from the south,
their supplies had never been cut off, so they should not have been "eating roots of grass and
throwing stones as weapon"123 as they recorded.
On the same day, the Japanese force that outflanked to Henglingcheng deployed over 1000
troops and 7-8 canons to assault Laoyugou and Hezijian from Guodingshan, and they attacked
the Chinese position at the 850 Elevation when they got the chance,124 but were later repulsed by
the 19th and 20th Regiment in the 10th Brigade in the Chinese 4th Division. One of the Japanese
planes that flew at a low altitude was knocked down by the 8th Battalion and the machine-gun
3rd Battalion of the Chinese 19th Regiment.125
The Japanese Army could not capture Nankou and Jüyongguan quickly despite their
advantages in number and weaponry, so it started to bomb Huailai with air forces in order to
destroy the headquarters of the Chinese Army. Fortunately, the path connecting the headquarters
of the Chinese Army was built along the foot of the town walls of Huailai and remained
undamaged, and the communication facilities were also in good conditions. However, due to the
bombing on the railroad, launched by the Japanese air force behind the Chinese defense line, the
122 Gou 1962, 16.
123 Newspaper Group, Army Ministry of Japan 1938, 150,151.
124 Wang 1987, 28.
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transportation of the Chinese reinforcement was slowed down; the 21st Division could only have
one regiment (1300-1400 soldiers) transported to the front. The Chinese force was weakened
critically for it could not deploy all troops at one time.126

4.2.2 The Battles between Nankou and Henglingcheng
4.2.2.1 August 16
There was an especially heavy fog on this day. At dawn, the Japanese heavy artillery
bombed the mountain on the east of Nankou where the 2nd Battalion of the Chinese 529th
Regiment defended for three hours. Later, more than 30 Japanese tanks which provided cover for
600 infantry assaulted Huyu Village, while the Japanese artillery was bombing the position of
the Chinese 533rd Regiment at Jüyongguan until 3:00 p.m. At dusk, the Japanese Army attacked
again; the Chinese Army defended stoically, and the Japanese invaders lurked again.127
So far, the Chinese and Japanese forces shared the battlefront around Nankou equally.
Although the town of Nankou was occupied by the Japanese Army, the mountains on its two
sides were recaptured by the Chinese Amy after much combat, so the Japanese Army could not
move forward deeply into the Guan Valley. The Japanese Army had been outflanking to the west
and moving their main force to Henglingcheng for days, attempting to attack the Chinese Army
by surprise. So far, the intensity of the fighting in front of Nankou was mitigated slightly, and
Henglingcheng had become the key position that both the Chinese and Japanese forces fought
for.128
In order to block the gap in the defense between Nankou and Henglingcheng, General
Tang had moved the 564th Regiment in Zhu Huaibing's 94th Division from Yanqing to
Chenjiabu to consolidate and enhance the defense; this regiment and the 122nd Regiment from
the 21st Division were reorganized into a detachment and defended around the south-east of
Chadaocheng commanded by Wu Shaozhou, reconnecting with the defense at Chenjiabu. (See

126 Gou 1962, 16,17.
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figure 4 in Gou Jitang's Record)129 When the Japanese Army was intercepted by Wu Shaozhou
Detachment when trying to attack Huanglouyuan again, their attack failed.130 The 700-800
Japanese invaders from Nankou attempted to attack Huanglouyuan and Anzi Temple in several
groups, but were repulsed by Liu Hanxing's 20th Regiment in the 10th Brigade in the Chinese
4th Division.131
Although the main Japanese force was gradually moved to the west, the battles around
Nankou had not stopped. More than 1000 bombs were launched by the Japanese artillery.
4.2.2.2 August 17
The Japanese Army attacked Jüyongguan. The Chinese 533rd Regiment held their position,
suffering a casualty of over half of its troops.132
General Tang was concerned about the weakness on the right (west) wing of the Chinese
defense, so he ordered Commander Shi Jue to return his 12th Brigade to the 4th Division at
Henglingcheng. The 123th Regiment in the 6th Brigade in the Chinese 21st Division took over
the responsibility for the defense of Huailai under the command of Regimental Commander
Ma.133
The Japanese invaders outflanking from Nankou to Henglingcheng deployed over 3000
infantry, artillery, and planes to assault the position of Fu Jingfang's Chinese 19th Regiment in
the valley at Hezijian. They attempted to cut off the Chinese defense along the Great Wall and
disconnect Henglingcheng from Nankou. This group of Japanese invaders moved forward to the
north and attacked the Chinese position at 850 Elevation, fighting for 3 hours; the combat ended
in a stalemate and neither the Chinese nor the Japanese force could defeat the other. Later, over
1000 Japanese troops came to reinforce; while the Chinese 19th Regiment was trapped in the
combat around 850 Elevation, another group of Japanese troops broke into Great Wall Pass at

129 Gou 1962, 17.
130 Wang 1987, 28.
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132 Report of the Battles around Nankou by the Chinese 89th Division. Changping District Committee of the
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Huanglouyuan. Ni Zuyao's 23rd Regiment in the Chinese 12th Brigade rushed to reinforce the
defense, rearranging their positions along 850 Elevation, Hezijian, West Liang, Huangtuwa, East
Liang and Jushuituo; one battalion of this regiment moved to the back side of the Japanese
intruders and intercepted them, threatening their rear. The battle fell into another stalemate when
the Japanese troops became exhausted.134 However, more Japanese troops came to reinforce. The
Wu Shaozhou Detachment at Shixia and the 10th Brigade in the 4th Division at Huanglouyuan in
danger of defeat, and the beacon tower of the Great Wall on the east of 850 Elevation fell to the
Japanese force.135
In the evening, over 2000 Japanese troops moved along the valleys from Sulinkou to
Yangjuanzi, which is eight kilometers away from Qinglongqiao on the south-west, attempting to
capture the area at the rear of Jüyongguan defended by the 267th Brigade in the Chinese 89th
Division and to destroy the core of the Chinese defense. General Wang Zhonglian and Brigadier
Lai Ruxiong believed that the control of Yangjuanzi was critical for the survival of Jüyongguan,
so the intruders must be eliminated. As General Wang planned, the 121st Regiment in the
Chinese 21st Division was sent to capture the position on the right side of the river under the
command of Lai Ruxiong, then to besiege the Japanese intruders with the Chinese 267th Brigade;
the threat would be removed. Unfortunately, the Japanese reinforcement of about 3000-4000
troops came to attack the Chinese force in the heavy fog, and the situation became worse for the
Chinese defense power.136
When the right (west) wing of the Chinese defense was threatened, 500-600 puppet troops
of the Japanese Army in Rehe Province made a feint attack at Dushikou under the command of
Major KoToshio, but were soon repulsed by the 501st Regiment of the Chinese 84th Division.
Lieutenant Uma-sho Yoshinari of the Japanese artillery and 7 Japanese soldiers were shot; 8
commanders, 13 soldiers, 8 horses and 45 rifles of the Japanese Army were seized by the
Chinese 84th Division who also suffered 15 casualties.137
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4.2.2.3 August 18
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek sent several telegrams to General Tang, telling him that it
was possible to hold the position and wait for the reinforcements from Fangshan and Zhuolu
commanded by General Wei Lihuang. Generalissimo Chiang hoped that General Tang could
hold for a few more days until General Wei's reinforcements arrived; he emphasized that Huailai
was the most critical place that should not fall, even if other positions might be hard to hold.138
The Japanese Army had never stopped attacking the positions of the Chinese defense
power around Nankou since the beginning of the campaign. Deshengkou was bombed by the
Japanese artillery and air forces again on August 18th. The Chinese force could only rely on the
terrain of the mountains they were familiar with and counterattack the Japanese invaders with
this advantage. Sometimes they even needed to defend with hand-to-hand combat, and the
Japanese force could still not capture a position on any of those mountains. For the Japanese
army, this was probably the largest battle in mountains they had ever experienced.139
When the fog lifted at dawn, more than 10 Japanese air fighters, covering their infantry and
cavalry, started to attack the Chinese defense power fiercely around Yangjuanzi. The Chinese
soldiers defended their positions with their own bodies against the Japanese planes and tanks
under the command of General Wang and Brigadier Lai; the combat was unprecedentedly severe.
The 124th Regiments of the Chinese 21st Division came to reinforce at the right side of the
position of the 121st Regiment, slightly relieving the intensity. General Tang promised a reward
of 10,000 Yuan to those who would recapture Yangjuanzi and the positions on the west bank of
the river, hoping that it would boost the morale of the Chinese Army. The Chinese soldiers
fought for four hours without expecting to survive and took back control of the high land on the
west of the river, eliminated 631 Japanese invaders, and also suffered over 800 casualties.
Yangjuanzi had not been recaptured, yet, but the superiority of the Japanese Army was reduced.
At 7:00 p.m., General Wang of the Chinese 89th Division sent a group of commandos to
counterattack the invaders who attempted to sneak to the back side of Jüyongguan on the day
before. The Chinese commandos avoided the invaders to ambush them in the valley of Sulinkou.

138 Telegram Sent by Chiang Kai-shek to Tang Enbo on August 18th, 1937. Changping District Committee of the
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The Japanese troops failed to capture Jüyongguan and were ambushed when retreating through
Sulinkou. Platoon Leader Du of the Chinese commandos ordered his soldiers to stay silent until
over half of the Japanese troops got through, and then suddenly strike them with hand grenades.
The Japanese invaders was scared by the unexpected attack and fled in a hurry. The Chinese
commandos gained 4 horses, 17 rifles and 29 heads of the Japanese invaders in this battle.140
After Brigadier Shi Jue returned with his 12th Brigade to the Chinese 4th Division at
Henglingcheng, General Wang Wanling of the Chinese 4th Division sent the 10th and 12th
Brigades to counterattack Huanglouyuan according to General Tang's order. Brigadier Shi
brought Jiang Dangyi's 24th Regiment to reinforce the position on the north of Huanglouyuan in
coordination with the 10th Brigade and Wu Shaozhou Detachment. These three groups of the
Chinese Army besieged the Japanese invaders at Huanglouyuan and Tumuyao, reaching a
stalemate at Beiqiling and Laoyugou. The Chinese Army suffered heavy casualties and found it
hard to recapture the position. When the 1st battalion of the Chinese 19th Regiment was fighting
against the Japanese force at Aoyugou, the Japanese air force and artillery came to bomb this
area; the Chinese battalion at the defense suffered terrible casualties and the survivors were less
than 1/3 of the entire battalion;141 Zhou Gui, the commander of a squad in this battalion, held his
position until he died of his injuries. The Chinese force had not recaptured Huanglouyuan, but it
still fiercely struck the Japanese intruders and forced them to switch into a defensive status.142
4.2.2.4 August 19
Generalissimo Chiang telegraphed General Tang, ordering him to defend tenaciously and
wait for the reinforcements led by General Wei Lihuang, which would arrive on the 21st or 22nd;
Generalissimo Chiang also reminded General Tang that the advantages of the Japanese Army in
their weaponry and tactics would be weakened in the mountains, which would provide the
Chinese Army an opportunity to strike back.143
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Prior to the dawn, both sides already started to attack each other; the severity was beyond
description. Commanders of the Chinese 4th, 31st and 89th Divisions coordinated with each
other. Chen Daqing, Vice Commander of the 4th Division, led his troops to encircle and
eliminate the invaders within several sectors. The Japanese force at Yangjuanzi was repulsed.
According to the uniforms of the 250 corpses of the Japanese soldiers and commanders including
Lieutenant Colonel Kawaguchi and Captain Kuwata, the Chinese Army knew that they were the
troops of the Japanese 38th Regiment. The Chinese Army suffered over 400 casualties, but they
got 8 light machine guns and 53 rifles from the Japanese force.144
Early in the morning, the Japanese planes bombed Jüyongguan first, and then several
Japanese tanks attacked the Chinese 533rd Regiment's position on the right of Jüyongguan with
500-600 infantry but were repulsed by the Chinese defense power under the command of Li
Shouzheng. To avoid being surrounded by the Japanese force, the 7th battalion of the Chinese
530th Regiment came to reinforce. The Japanese force broke into the Chinese position in the
afternoon, but soon it was recaptured by the 2nd battalion of the Chinese 533rd Regiment. Later,
the main force of the Japanese 38th Regiment attacked Jüyongguan with the cover of their tanks
and artillery; in addition, they launched toxic bombs this time, and the Chinese defense power
was endangered. Major Na, commander of a battalion of the Chinese 533rd, led his troops to
combat the intruders with swords; the Japanese soldiers lost their advantage in the melee, and
retreated. Almost all the positions of the Chinese 533rd Regiments were destroyed by the
Japanese tanks and artillery; three commanders of companies sacrificed their lives, and more
than half of the soldiers in Major Na's battalion died or were wounded in the combat. The
casualties of the Japanese force doubled.145
The 10th Brigade in the Chinese 4th Division defended firmly at their positions around
Huanglouyuan, East Daling and West Daling146. The 12th Brigade moved to the East from
Henglingcheng; Wu Shaozhou Detachment moved to the south-west from Shixia; the 10th
Brigade moved to the south from Huanglouyuan. All these troops started to attack the Japanese
144 Gou 1962, 18.
145 As Wang Zhonglian said, the two Japanese commanders, Lieutenant Colonel Kawaguchi and Captain Kuwata,
were killed in this battle instead of the battle at Yangjuanzi mentioned in the previous paragraph. Wang 1987,
31.
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force at the north of 850 Elevation and 710 Elevation at 4:00 a.m. During the battle, the 1st and
2nd Battalions of the Japanese 12th Regiment arrived to reinforce. Both armies struggled around
Huanglouyuan, Hezijian, Shaguopu, Yuanjiayao and 850 Elevation and fought over 10 times;
The Chinese defense power finally repelled the Japanese force and blocked the gap of the
defense at Huanglouyuan. The Japanese intruders then launched many toxic bombs to the
Chinese position at the east of 850 Elevation. The Chinese defense power incurred casualties and
was unable to counterattack. Lieutenant Colonel Liu Fanggui, commander of the 122nd
Regiment in the Chinese 4th Division, fell in the battle; Wang Han, commander of the 1st
battalion, and Liu Yaonan, commander of the 3rd battalion of the 19th Regiment in the Chinese
4th Division, were gravely wounded. The Chinese force suffered 1240 casualties in this battle,
seizing 14 light machine guns, 134 rifles, 5 rocket launchers, 7 swords and 2 pistols from the
Japanese troops; the Japanese suffered casualties nearly twice of the Chinese.147
Fu Zuoyi, commander of the Chinese 7th Army Group, said in his telegram that the 72nd
Division had nearly arrived at the front under the command of Chen Changjie, and the rest of the
troops reached Damiao. According to the former plan, the 72nd Division was going to reinforce
the defense at Nankou after attacking the rear of the Japanese Army in Zhangbei. However,
General Chen made the north of Chahar his secondary target to reinforce, in order to assist the
Chinese 13th Army to rescue the endangered front line around Nankou first.148 Zhang Shuzhen's
416th Regiment in the Chinese 72nd Division had already arrived in Huailai when the telegram
was sent.149
The reinforcement of the Chinese Army was delayed by the weak transportation of the
Beiping-Suiyuan Railroad, with only one or two regiments arriving on every single day. In that
period, the capacities of the Chinese military units were small; there were less than 1500 troops
in one regiment, and some military units were not complete. However, the casualties reached
1,000 - 2,000 every day, which could not be recovered by the reinforcements. The Chinese force
was dwindling.150 On that day (August 19), the 123rd and 124th Regiments in the Chinese 21st
147 Gou 1962, 18.
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Division arrived at Jüyongguan and Qinglongqiao to reinforce the defense under the command of
the 89th Division.151
The Japanese Army only needed to break one point on the Chinese defense line, so they
could deploy and move their troops to wherever they felt it was easy to attack. In addition, the
Japanese force had powerful reinforcements constantly arriving, including the 5th Division who
arrived on that day under the command of Itagaki.152
On the same day, about 300 - 400 Japanese troops broke through the Great Wall pass at
910 Elevation on the north of Huanglouyuan, attempting to attack Kangzhuang and Huailai.
General Li Xianzhou, commander of the Chinese 21st Division, led the 63rd Brigade (without
the 124th and 126th Regiments) to rescue the Great Wall pass, moving along Ganzhuangzi,
North Chenjiabu and South Chenjiabu. He also ordered Vice commander Huang to move the
126th Regiment via Dongzhuangzi, Yangzhuangzi and Yaojiahe to Chenjiabu as the combat
reserve. At 2:00 p.m., General Li occupied the position on the Great Wall with the 125th
Regiment and repelled the intruders. The gap was blocked and the positions on the east and west
sides along the Great Wall connected with General Li's troops.153

4.2.3 Defense Broken, the Rear Threatened
4.2.3.1 August 20
The heavy rain and fog slightly relieved the intensity of the battles. No large-scaled battle
broke out around Nankou or Deshengkou on that day, but the Japanese Army never stopped
harassing with small squads.154 General Tang understood that instead of being defeated, the
Japanese Army was preparing for another massive attack. General Fu Zuoyi, the highest
commander of the Chinese 7th Army Group, urged Chen Changjie and Ma Yanshou to bring the
72nd Division and the Independent 7th Brigade respectively to Huailai, while he moved to
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Huailai himself from Datong for the military conference. Conferees included General Tang Enbo,
General Zhang Xuezhong (Chief of Staff of the Chinese 13th Army), General Zhu Huaibing,
General Chen Changjie in the 7th Army Group, as well as some other commanders of the
Chinese Army. It was decided that the 72nd Division and Independent 7th Brigade would attack
the Japanese troops that had broken into Huanglouyuan; and, after recapturing Guodingshan and
Beiqiling, they would be positioned to defend at these places. The reinforcements would be
drawn back to Zhangyuan in order to get control of Zhangbei. General Tang then reorganized the
troops according to General Fu's order, sending the 72nd Division to Henglingcheng as the main
force to retake Beiqiling on the east; he sent the Independent 7th Brigade to Kangzhuang to
attack the Japanese invaders at Diaoming Lake from Chenjiabu. These two forces would
coordinate with the 4th Division to eliminate the Japanese invaders at Huanglouyuan.155
Brigadier Lü Ruiying and Liang Chunpu commanded the 415th and 433rd Regiments in the 72nd
Division to defend along the Great Wall around Henglingcheng. Realizing that the terrain of that
area was different from the sketch map, General Chen went to the position of the 416th
Regiment in the valley along the Great Wall with his cavalry and artillery to get the accurate
maps drawn by Zhang Shuzhen, commander of the 416th Regiment, according to his survey.156
Zhangyuan was bombed by Japanese planes and artillery, and then attacked by 60 tanks
and more than 1,000 infantry. The Chinese defense power suffered heavy casualties, and the
camps and the radio station were destroyed. The Chinese soldiers struggled to hold their position
while requesting reinforcements from General Fu.157
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4.2.3.2 August 21
Generalissimo Chiang asked He Yingqin about the number of gas masks in storage, and
ordered him to distribute all the masks to General Tang's troops around Nankou.158 He was
concerned the Japanese Army would deploy chemical weapons again.
At dawn, the Japanese main force started to attack Henglingcheng;159 meanwhile, the
Chinese forces at Jüyongguan, Qinglongqiao and Deshengkou made a feint at the Japanese.160
The Japanese Army attacked Henglingcheng in three groups from different directions: of
the two main forces including 4,000 - 5,000 troops and 20 artillery in each, one attacked
Huangniwa from the north of Beiqiling, and the other attacked from the elevation on the west of
Huangniwa; the third group consisted of 3,000 troops and 10 artillery who assaulted the 850
Elevation which was defended by the Chinese 4th Division and the Wu Shaozhou Detachment.
In the morning, three groups of the Japanese air force (including 5 planes in each), bombed the
battlefield with their artillery, forcing the Chinese force to take cover without a chance to
counterattack. The Chinese soldiers were accustomed to such sorts of bombing; they took cover
within the terrain and fortifications, waiting for a chance to strike the Japanese infantry when
they came close. After multiple hand-to-hand attacks, most Japanese intruders were eliminated in
front of the positions of the Chinese Army. Only one battalion of the 19th Regiment of the
Chinese 4th Division lost most of its soldiers inside the position at Huangniwa after being
bombed by the Japanese air force, artillery and toxic gas. The Japanese intruders broke into
Huangniwa at noon. (Lieutenant) Colonel Fu Jingfang of the Chinese 19th Regiment had to
defend the position with cooks and grooms. Fortunately, (Lieutenant) Colonel Jiang Dangyi
brought two battalions of the 24th Regiment and (Lieutenant) Colonel Ni Zuyao brought one
battalion of the 23rd Regiment to reinforce under the supervision of General Shi Jue, attacking
the Japanese intruders on the east of Henglingcheng and Changyucheng. The Japanese Army was
defeated.161 In addition, General Chen Changjie arrived at Henglingcheng with his 72nd Division
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to reinforce around 9:00 a.m. when the Japanese force broke into the positions of the Chinese 4th
Division.162 The Chinese Army could have annihilated the intruders with one strike at that
moment. But this plan could not be carried out when the Japanese 15th Regiment suddenly came
to reinforce. The Chinese 4th Division was endangered again at 12:40 p.m., suffering terrible
casualties.163 Brigadier Lü Ruiying of the 72nd Division brought Gao Jinbo's 415th Regiment to
reinforce; however, the defense of the 4th Division was broken by the Japanese Army before the
reinforcement arrived. Two mountains were controlled by the Japanese force. (Lieutenant)
Colonel Gao was injured soon after he joined the combat. The Chinese cannons were
overwhelmed by the Japanese artillery, so the Chinese altered the tactics, suppressing the
Japanese machine guns and infantry with one moving cannon behind every position.164 The
position on the west of 870 Elevation fell to the Japanese Army again after having been captured
by both Chinese and Japanese forces multiple times. The Chinese force had to be drawn back to
their positions at Huilingzi and along the Great Wall, waiting for a chance to counterattack.165
Since most of the Chinese defenses were positioned in the mountains, only one regiment
could be transported to the front each time. The Chinese Army found it difficult to concentrate
its reinforcements. Once the Japanese Army took advantage of the terrain, the Chinese
reinforcements would be at risk of being defeated separately. 166
The Chinese troops counterattacking Qinglongqiao and Jüyongguan made little progress
on that day, except that the Wu Shaozhou Detachment recaptured the 700 Elevation in front of
Caojialing and seized considerable quantities of equipment and supplies after repelling the
Japanese guarding troops. At 10:00 a.m., the Japanese bombed the position of the Chinese 122nd
Regiment at West Daling with artillery and assaulted the same place with 500 - 600 infantry. The
Chinese 126th Regiment rushed to reinforce, and the 125th Regiment attacked the rear of the
Japanese troops from the left. The Japanese invaders retreated at noon. The Chinese 126th
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164 Chen 1986, 172.
165 Gou 1962, 20.
166 Gou 1962, 20.
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Regiment suffered serious casualties and had to head back to Chenjiabu to rehabilitate at 7:00
p.m.167
In the morning of the same day, the Japanese Army also attacked the Chinese position at
Xiaguan of Jüyongguan with infantry, artillery (tanks), and planes. The Japanese infantry troops
were afraid to get close until their artillery and air force had destroyed all Chinese fortifications.
Over half of the soldiers in the Chinese 123rd Regiment died or were injured in the hand-to-hand
combat. The mountain on the south-east, closest to Xiaguan had once fallen to the Japanese force.
General Wang Zhonglian attached a great importance to this mountain, for it was a perfect
position for overlooking at Xiaguan. Therefore, at 5:00 p.m., he ordered Li Jin, the commander
of the 3rd Battalion of the Chinese 530th Regiment, to recapture all five mountains on the south
east of Xiaguan in the night, and his troops would be commanded by Brigadier Cui from the
Chinese 21st Division. The secret agents (troops who were responsible for special missions) of
the division equipped this battalion with 30 Mauser guns and 30 Chinese war swords.
Commander Li soon selected 30 elite soldiers from his battalion and equipped each one with a
pistol, a broad war-sword, and 4 hand grenades. Brigadier Cui passed the information about the
Japanese troops (received through the reconnaissance) to Commander Li, and ordered him to
bring the troops back to defend at Jüyongguan if the counterattack was not successful. But
Commander Li swore to recapture the mountain at all costs and issued a plan for the
counterattack. The soldiers pledged to get the position on that mountain back even if it meant
they would die.168
In the vicinity of Zhangyuan, the Japanese Army launched attacks with over 3,000 infantry
and 30 artillery at the positions of the Chinese Army at Bajiaotai, Datun and Ciershan. The
Chinese troops lurked, waiting for the Japanese troops to get close. When the Japanese invaders
arrived, the Chinese defenders suddenly started to counterattack with machine guns from
different directions. The Japanese troops retreated for a short time, but they soon deployed their
main force to assault Bajiaotai again. The battle became even fiercer. Though the Chinese force
was outnumbered at that moment, its morale was not undermined. The Japanese suffered over

167 Detailed Report of the Battles around Nankou by the Chinese 21st Division. Changping District Committee of
the CPPCC 2007, 48.
168 Wang 1987, 31,32.
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200 casualties and the other 200 troops were surrounded by the Chinese 1st and 6th
Regiments.169
4.2.3.3 August 22
At 3:00 a.m., the Chinese 121st Regiment and the 2nd Battalion of the Chinese 124th
Regiment attacked the Japanese Army in darkness, and recaptured the positions on the south of
Yangtaizi, which the Chinese 89th Division had lost to the Japanese.170
At dawn, the Japanese artillery bombed the mountains on the south and north of
Jüyongguan in order to determine if the Chinese Army was defending those places; but the
Chinese troops hid themselves and counterattacked after the Japanese troops came close.171
Another group of Japanese troops attacked Yangjuanzi and Majiayao with their planes while
harassing the Chinese position at Jiuxian Temple. The Chinese 534th Regiment fought the
Japanese intruders with swords. Though they suffered heavy casualties, the invaders were still
repelled.172
The Chinese 415th Regiment fought against the "outnumbering" Japanese troops in the
mountains on the south west of Changyucheng, and one of the Chinese positions was lost. The
Chinese positions defended by the 4th Division at Luozijuan, Fang'anyu and Laohutou were
seized by the invaders. The Chinese 19th and 24th Regiments kept resisting when the 416th
Regiment in the Chinese 72nd Division came to reinforce and got back their positions. The
Chinese Army suffered heavy casualties; Zhang Shuzhen, the commander of the Chinese 416th
Division, and Major Sun, the commander of a battalion in the 416th Division, lost their lives in
the battle. The 3rd Battalion of the Chinese 433rd Regiment resisted the invaders that were few
times more than themselves in number. All of its soldiers were martyred after being isolated.
Meanwhile, another group of Japanese troops attacked Mabaoquan; Commander Gao of the

169 A Brief Summary of the Battles of the Chinese 68th Army (reorganized from the 142nd Division) in
Zhangyuan. Changping District Committee of the CPPCC 2007, 58.
170 Detailed Report of the Battles around Nankou by the Chinese 21st Division. Changping District Committee of
the CPPCC 2007, 49.
171 Wang 1978, 4021.
172 Report of the Battles around Nankou by the Chinese 89th Division. Changping District Committee of the
CPPCC 2007, 40,42.
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Chinese 415th Regiment was injured in the skirmish. The morale of the Chinese 4th and 72nd
Divisions was boosted despite their horrible casualties. Soldiers and commanders made an oath
that they would dedicate their lives to their defending their positions.173
Another large group of Japanese troops from Mabaoquan attacked the positions defended
by the Chinese 72nd Division around Zhenbiancheng and Huilingzi, attempting to control the
rear of the Chinese defense. The Chinese 72nd Division fought hard, but still had one of their
positions 2 kilometers away on the south of Henglingcheng overtaken by the Japanese force.
Both sides alternately controlled that position many times, and the Chinese Army got it back
finally by the end of that day.174
The Chinese Army kept fighting in spite of difficulties, without reinforcements or supplies,
between Nankou and Hengling for days, suffering 1000 - 2000 casualties every day; on August
22nd the number of casualties reached 2500. But Wei Lihuang's reinforcements, which should
have already arrived, still did not show up or send any message.175 Without any reinforcement,
the Chinese Army’s positions at 1390 Elevation, 1120 Elevation and other places fell to the
Japanese Army.176
In the vicinity of Zhangyuan, the Japanese planes dropped supplies to their comrades that
were besieged by the Chinese force on the previous day (August 21), and strafed the Chinese
troops at a low altitude. 70 - 80 Japanese soldiers took that opportunity and escaped. Another
1500 Japanese troops attacked the city of Zhangyuan and fought the Chinese defense power.177
4.2.3.4 August 23
The Japanese Army started to fiercely attack Majiayao and Jiuxian Temple on the left (east)
wing of the Chinese defense at dawn. The Chinese soldiers defended with hand-to-hand combat

173 Changping District Committee of the CPPCC 2007, 20;
Chen 1986, 172,173.
174 Gou 1962, 21,22.
175 Gou 1962, 21,22.
176 Newspaper Group, Army Ministry of Japan 1938, 151,152.
177 A Brief Summary of the Battles of the Chinese 68th Army (reorganized from the 142nd Division) in
Zhangyuan. Changping District Committee of the CPPCC 2007, 58.

- 70 -

and the Japanese troops failed to capture any positions.178 At 7:00 a.m., the Chinese position at
Chenjiabu was bombed by over 10 Japanese planes, which fortunately avoided human casualties;
only a few horses and mules were injured. At 7:00 p.m., the Japanese main force broke through
the Chinese 4th and 72nd Division's defense after a fierce attack. The right (west) wing of the
Chinese defense was endangered.179 At 12:00 at night, the Chinese main force enhanced the
defense at Jiuxian Temple, getting ready for a desperate combat against the Japanese intruders.180
The Chinese Army's pressure around Nankou and Jüyongguan on the left (east) wing of the
defense was slightly relieved. The Japanese Army continued to outflank to the west after their
failure in attacking Huanglouyuan. They attempted to capture Zhenbiancheng so as to get
through the mountain ridge from Shuitou.181
In the afternoon, the Japanese force in front of Henglingcheng became active again. A
Japanese regiment in Itagaki‘s 5th Division sent its troops along 3 different routes and started to
attack the position defended by the Chinese 415th Regiment. Gao Jinbo, the commander of the
Chinese 415th Regiment, ordered his troops to remain in small strongholds to ambush the
intruders with Lü Ruiying's moving artillery. The combat did not end until midnight, when the
Chinese troops repelled the Japanese invaders and seized weapons and a map left by the
Japanese soldiers. The map, which was drawn before the 918 Incident in 1931, had once been
held by a wounded Japanese captain. The scale of that map was 1/50,000 and was clear enough
to show the details of the terrain, which showed that Japan had planned to invade China or even
the entire East Asia for a long time. The Japanese troops tried to invade Henglingcheng in the
night for a second time, but failed again.182
The Chinese troops at the front of the Nankou Campaign had not heard from Wei
Lihuang's reinforcements, and had a hard time in holding their positions. Due to the shortage of

178 Report of the Battles around Nankou by the Chinese 89th Division, Changping District Committee of the
CPPCC 2007, 40.
179 Detailed Report of the Battles around Nankou by the Chinese 21st Division, Changping District Committee of
the CPPCC 2007, 50.
180 Report of the Battles around Nankou by the Chinese 89th Division, Changping District Committee of the
CPPCC 2007, 40.
181 Gou 1962, 22,23.
182 Chen 1986, 174.
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troops, the Chinese Army had to draw back its force to consolidate four defense points at
Jüyongguan, Henglingcheng, Yanqing and Huailai.183
4.2.3.5 August 24
The Japanese heavy artillery bombed the mountain on the south of Jüyongguan before
daybreak, after which more than 1000 Japanese infantry troops fiercely attacked the same
position defended by the Chinese force.184 At dawn, East and West Daling suffered a bombing
launched by over 10 Japanese planes and 30 cannons; fierce hand-to-hand combat occurred soon
after the bombing. Commanders below the battalion level and all soldiers of the Chinese force
were killed, and West Daling fell to the Japanese.185 Around 6:00 a.m., the Chinese positions
around Jüyongguan were bombed by the Japanese planes for a second time. Simultaneously,
skirmishes broke out at Yangtaizi, Mazhuangzi, Majiayao, Huyu, and Deshengkou.
At 2:00 p.m., the Japanese troops suspended the attack around Jüyongguan, for they
wanted to wait for their reinforcements of over 3000 infantry and 20 armored vehicles, who were
about to arrive at Nankou Railway Station by train. At 5:00 p.m., the Japanese Army started the
bombing again with over 10 heavy cannons; the Sanbu Station in front of Jüyongguan was
bombed by more than 200 shells.186 After the dusk, the Chinese Army at Jüyongguan sent troops
to strike the Japanese camps in darkness. The Japanese invaders filled with arrogance relying on
their superior weapons, were frustrated.187
The outflanking Japanese troops moved through Zhenbiancheng to Shibajia on the south of
Huailai, and later assaulted Huailai and Kangzhuang. The Japanese planes also kept bombing the
railway in that area all day long until the railroads were entirely destroyed. The communications

183 Gou 1962, 22,23.
184 Wang 1987, 33.
185 Detailed Report of the Battles around Nankou by the Chinese 21st Division, Changping District Committee of
the CPPCC 2007, 50.
186 Wang 1987, 33.
187 Report of the Battles around Nankou by the Chinese 89th Division. Changping District Committee of the
CPPCC 2007, 25.
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network connecting Jüyongguan and Huailai installed by the Chinese Army was broken at
intervals.188
The Chinese force defending Zhangyuan ambushed the Japanese vanguards who attempted
to attack the areas around the city of Zhangyuan, including Dajingmen and Shuimugong. The
battle became fierce when the rest of the Japanese troops arrived, but the Japanese did not break
into any of the Chinese positions.189
General Wei Lihuang's three divisions were blocked by the Japanese force at
Huangyangang and Qinyukou on the way to reinforce the Chinese Army at the front of the
Nankou Campaign. The Chinese headquarters could no longer defend itself since all guarding
troops were sent to the front and no available reinforcement had arrived. It was forced to move to
Sangyuan and Fanshanbu, where it had not been threatened, in order to avoid being destroyed.190
4.2.3.6 August 25
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek sent General Tang Enbo a telegram, ordering General
Tang to command the Chinese forces in Nankou Campaign to defend their positions and not
retreat. The Chinese soldiers were reminded to wear gas masks in case the Japanese Army used
more chemical bombs.191
At 2:00 a.m., General Tang left the headquarters in Huailai by truck with General Zhu
Huaibing, Staff Gou Jitang and a few guards, leaving Colonel Cai Jianming, the leader of the
staff officers, in Huailai for garrison duty. General Tang no longer had any guardian troops in
reserve. The truck was followed by the Japanese planes which dropped many bombs all the way
from Huailai through Sangyuan to Fanshanbu; the planes, however, failed to bomb the truck.
General Tang ordered Lieutenant Colonel Quan Ying of the 3rd staff officers' class to return
along the Yongding River to the area around Shuitou and Henglingcheng by to contact the
Chinese 4th and 72nd Divisions. Lieutenant Colonel Quan found that the two divisions were still
188 Wang 1987, 36.
189 A Brief Summary of the Battles of the Chinese 68th Army (reorganized from the 142nd Division) in
Zhangyuan. Changping District Committee of the CPPCC 2007, 59.
190 Gou 1962, 24.
191 Telegram Sent by Chiang Kai-shek to Tang Enbo on August 25th, 1937. Changping District Committee of the
CPPCC 2007, 14.
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fighting against the invaders sporadically. Meanwhile, General Tang ordered his adjutant, Major
Liu Juemin, to return to Huailai to assist Colonel Cai Jianming and determine the situation of Ma
Yanshou's Independent 7th Brigade which was surrounded by the Japanese. When arriving at
Daqiying, 10 kilometers on the west of Huailai, Major Liu heard gunfire, seeing Colonel Cai
who just broke out of the Japanese encirclement with a platoon. Then he knew that Huailai had
already been besieged by over 2000 Japanese cavalry troops since the dawn on that day. He soon
moved to Sangyuan together with Colonel Cai.192
The Japanese Army launched a full-scale offensive early in the morning. Jüyongguan was
attacked by more than 20 tanks, 30 heavy artillery, and numerous infantry.193 The battles at
Majiayao, Yangtaizi, Huyu and Deshengkou also became fierce. The Chinese defenses could
only hold their positions until 7:00 p.m.194 The Chinese 89th Division defending at Jüyongguan,
which had originally included four regiments, could only deploy one regiment after fighting for
days. General Wang Zhonglian, counterattacked the Japanese intruders at Nankou with the only
troops in his division, but the morale was still high. General Tang once described the situation as
"remnants [of the army] defending at Jüyongguan" before he left Huailai and moved the
headquarters (to Sangyuan).195
The Chinese 89th and 21st Divisions lost most of their troops, and began to retreat to
Yanqing at night; the 4th and 72nd Divisions struggled to break the Japanese encirclement and
retreat to Sangyuan; the 94th Division was responsible for covering other troops in Yanqing and
Zhuolu while retreating; the 84th Division was drawn back to Shacheng; and the Independent 7th
Brigade stayed in Huailai for defense.196

192 Gou 1962, 24.
193 Wang 1987, 34.
194 Report of the Battles around Nankou by the Chinese 89th Division. Changping District Committee of the
CPPCC 2007, 25.
195 Wang 1987, 34,35.
196 Meeting Minutes of Nankou Campaign. Changping District Committee of the CPPCC 2007, 21.
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4.3 Strategic Retreat
4.3.1.1 August 26
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek telegraphed General Tang Enbo, in which General Tang
was given an option to draw back the Chinese troops to Yu County, Guangling and Laiyuan if it
were not possible to keep fighting; but he was still required to keep contacting General Wei
Lihuang’s divisions for reinforcement.197 In the main battlefield of the Nankou Campaign, the
Chinese 21st and 89th Divisions had reported an emergency by midnight between the 25th and
26th; the city of Zhangyuan had nearly fallen; Wei Lihuang’s troops were still blocked on the
way by the Japanese, without any hope to reinforce the front. Therefore, General Tang had to
change the plan and let the Chinese troops retreat in order. The Chinese Independent 7th Brigade
defended in Huailai to guarantee that other troops could retreat in safety.198
Regardless of the awful weather, the Japanese planes persisted in bombing the Chinese
strongholds. The Chinese defense left the front of Jüyongguan, and the Japanese Army could
finally take control of the Guan Valley from Jüyongguan to Badaling. The Japanese invaders
were extremely excited about this achievement which they “would never forgot even in dreams
while sleeping”199.

197 Telegram Sent by Chiang Kai-shek to Tang Enbo on August 26th 1937. Changping District Committee of the
CPPCC 2007, 14.
198 Gou 1962, 24,25.
199 Newspaper Group, Army Ministry of Japan 1938, 157.
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5 Significance of Nankou Campaign
The meaning for the strategy in the early time of WWII has been briefly discussed in the
section of the historical background. Here in this section is a comparison of the result and
achievements between the Nankou Campaign and some other critical military operations in the
early time of each theater; it is clear that the Chinese Army, with a more inferior condition and
an earlier outbreak of war, was not doing worse than the other Allied powers. Thus, the previous
opinion raised by John King Fairbank in his book series Cambridge History of China that the
Republic of China had few achievements and was only waiting for other Allied powers’
assistance during WWII200 needs to be revised.

5.1 Numbers of Casualties
Casualties somehow reflect the cost and the scale of a campaign. It is also, however, not
simple to keep the number of casualties accurate for there is no time for the survivors to count
the dead and wounded after a battle.
The casualties of the Nankou Campaign have been counted and calculated by different
groups, including both Chinese and Japanese. The numbers found today vary vastly with
different sources. The casualties recorded in Gou Jitang’s book are the most detailed, which
provides the number for each division or regiment. The number in total for the Chinese Army
turns out to be 16,643. Besides, General Tan Ying writes in his memoir “Our soldiers and
commanders suffered casualties of over 16,600...”201, which meets the number provided by Gou
Jitang. Unfortunately, the 84th Division and the Artillery 27th Regiment had not reported their
casualties to the command center by the end of the campaign. The casualties of the Chinese
Army should be more than 16,643. According to the information of Chinese NRA that attended
the Nankou Campaign in Gou Jitang’s record (See Tab. 2.1 in Section 2.3.1), the 17th Army,
consisting of 21st and 84th Divisions, had 14 thousand soldiers approximately; while 27th
Regiment had less than 2,000. Even if it is assumed that 10,000 in the 17th Army were from 84th
200 Fairbank, John King. The Cambridge History of China. Edited by John King Fairbank and Albert Feuerwerker.
Vol. 13. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986. 547-608.
201 Tan 2011, 55.
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Division and they were either wounded or died, the casualties of the entire Chinese force should
be no more than 28 thousand202.
Tab. 5.1 Number of Casualties of the Chinese Army in the Nankou Campaign, by Gou Jitang203
Commanders

Soldiers
sum

Wounded

Died

Wounded

Died

4th Division

85

47

3822

2599

6553

89th Division

102

34

4034

1914

6084

21st Division

74

24

1595

584

2277

72nd Division

36

23

418

441

918

94th Division

36

11

318

166

531

84th Division

not reported

Independent 7th Brigade

15

6

163

96

280

27th Regiment (Artillery)

not reported

Total

348

145

10,350

5800

16,643

Meeting Minutes of the Warzone II204 provided the data of casualties, most of which are
very different from Gou Jitang’s records. Since Gou Jitang’s records were just a manuscript
which was not published until postwar time and few people had the access to his manuscript, so
Gou Jitang’s did not have any purpose other than taking records. Thus, his words should be
objective, and the numbers he provided are considered more reliable than the numbers in the
minutes. The casualties reported in the meeting, however, might have been amplified for some
other purposes, for example, serious casualties (death and permanently disabled) is usually a
good excuse to ask the generalissimo for more soldiers and supplies. Thus, the casualty in total

202 This number, as 28 thousand, is a result of adding up 16 thousand (casualty of the entire Chinese force
excluding the ones that were not reported), 10 thousand (when it is assumed that 84th Division had the
majority of the 17th Army) and 2 thousand (maximum number of the soldiers in 27 Regiment).
203 Gou 1962, 42.
204 During the Second World War, the Theater of China was demarcated into many warzones based on the
boundaries of the provinces at the time. The major Chinese force that had fought against Japan in Nankou
Campaign moved to the second warzone after September, 1937. So the meeting was held in the name of
Warzone II.
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claimed by the meeting minutes, appeared as 33,992, nearly twice of the number in the primary
source recorded by Gou Jitang, is probably an exaggeration.
Unfortunately, most currently published books, articles and reports related to Nankou
Campaign are more likely to use the numbers in the minutes, which deliver less reliable
information.
Tab. 5.2 Number of Casualties of the Chinese Army in the Nankou Campaign205
Commanders

Soldiers

Horses

Wounded

Died

Wounded

Died

Wounded

Died

4th Division

180

130

4000

1700

700

400

89th Division

200

200

4500

1600

800

500

21st Division

160

148

2700

1300

600

300

72nd Division

80

118

2500

900

200

100

94th Division

150

106

5000

1500

600

200

84th Division

140

154

2600

1200

500

200

Independent 7th Brigade

60

34

800

600

70

60

21st Regiment (Artillery)

10

7

500

200

200

50

27th Regiment (Artillery)

9

6

400

100

60

40

Total

989

903

23000

9100

3730

1850

“History of China’s Anti-Japanese War (Volume II)” states that the casualties of Nankou
Campaign were around 26,736 without citing the source.206 This number is used by historians in
western countries.207 As the 84th Division and 27th Regiment had not reported their casualties, it
can only be assumed that the casualties of the 84th Division and the 27th Regiment were around
10,000, which makes up the total number as 26,000 with the number of other divisions provided
by Gou Jitang.

205 Meeting Minutes of Warzone II. Changping Committee of CPPCC 2007, 318.
206 Military History Department of the Chinese Military Academy 1994, 27.
207 Van de Ven 2003, 195;
Mitter 2013, 90.
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Casualties of the Japanese Army are also unclear. As it is published, the IJA only lost
2,000 soldiers in the Nankou Campaign; while records in China say over 15,000 enemies were
annihilated.
Although it is not simple to tell the exact number of Japanese soldiers who died in that
campaign without any authorized documents, it is sure that 2,000 is a boast. Based on the scale
of the Nankou Campaign, if the Japanese could really lose such a small amount of troops, they
should not have fought hard for 18 days. Besides, they kept moving to the west as a result of the
failure to capture Jüyongguan from the front side and throwing toxic gas bombs when it was
difficult to capture a stronghold, because the Chinese defensive force also repelled tenaciously
and gave them a hard time. Although in many battles the Chinese force lost nearly their entire
regiments, the casualties of Japanese intruders often doubled.208 So, it is not a great exaggeration
to declare that the Chinese defensive force had eliminated 15,000 Japanese invaders.

5.2 Achievement of the Chinese Army: A Miracle in Military History
China’s War of Resistance against Japan is an inseparable part of the Second World War.
Being the first mass campaign after the Republic of China proclaimed war against Japan, Nankou
Campaign, should have been generally acknowledged and well interpreted as the first campaign
of the redefined Second World War.
In most battles in the early time of the World War II, the Allies suffered defeats, such as
the Dunkirk Evacuation in 1940, in the European Theater; the Battle of Wake Island in 1941 in
the Pacific Ocean; and the Philippines Campaign in 1941-1942. The results of the Nankou
Campaign stand out. Despite the fact that Nankou had fallen at last, it was a great achievement
that the Chinese Revolutionary Army, with inferior weapons, could have kept fighting against
the overwhelming Imperial Japanese Army for 18 days in 1937. This was two years earlier than
the earliest battles in Europe. The Chinese Army held their positions for 18 days and annihilated
over 10,000 Japanese troops; the Chinese Army suffered approximately 30,000 casualties in that

208 Gou 1962, 14, 18.
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campaign.209 The Japanese invaders’ plan to capture Nankou in 5 days and defeat China within 3
months had failed. 210
Tab. 5.3 Comparison of Units and Weaponry between Chinese and Japanese Forces211
Chinese

Japanese

Infantry

About 60,000

Over 70,000

Cavalry

Few

Tanks and armored vehicles

Artillery

Tens of cannons

Hundreds of cannons

Air force

None

Fighters and bombers

Toxic Gas

Never have or use

Used many times

Fig. 5.1 a gas mask found in the battlefield of Nankou Campaign, by Yang Guoqing212

Apparently, the Chinese force was much weaker than the Japanese in the Nankou
Campaign. The Chinese soldiers had no anti-tank weapons; they invented "bundled hand
grenades" to destroy the Japanese tanks, at a terrible cost of soldiers' lives since the grenades

209 Changping District Committee of the CPPCC 2007, 318.
210 Wu 1992.
211 Gou 1962, 7-10.
212 The gas mask in this photo was found by Mr. Yang, a citizen in Changping District who has insisted on
searching and collecting remains discovered in the battlefield of Nankou Campaign.
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were only functional in a close distance.213 When the Japanese army could still not break the
defense of the Chinese force easily with their overwhelming power, their shame grew into anger
which pushed them to use toxic gas214 regardless of the Geneva Protocol215. Chiang Kai-shek had
to save the best troops for the Songhu Campaign (Shanghai Campaign), which broke out 5 days
later on August 13th in Shanghai. The only first rate troops sent to Nankou was the 13th Army,
armed with rifles bought from Germany, but they were still limited in number and lacked
artillery.216
It seemed that the terrain of the mountain ridge and the Great Wall in the battlefield were
the only advantage for the Chinese defensive force. These were not always advantageous;
however, since the Great Wall was built in ancient times to defend against the invaders from the
north, while in the Nankou Campaign, the invaders came from Beiping on the south east.
Sometimes, the structures of the Great Wall become obstacles for the defenders.217

5.3 Effect: One More Allied Power, One Less Axis Accomplice
In 1930s, the Republic of China had many joint operations with Germany, especially in
military programs. Many of the advisory counselors in the National Revolutionary Army were
from Germany. Also, China exchanged wolframite for weapons to build their mechanized armies,
which was, unfortunately, not accomplished because the war broke out ahead of the time that
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek had expected.218 Germany was an ally as well as the tutor of
Japan; therefore, China, had to renounce the assistance and advising from Germany once
engaged in war against Japan. The German government had considered persuading Japan to stop

213 Gou 1962, 35.
214 Gou 1962, 18.
215 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and of
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare 1925, text available at:
http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Bio/1925GenevaProtocol.shtml, or
http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Bio/pdf/Status_Protocol.pdf
216 Mitter 2013, 90.
217 Wang 1987, 11;
Tan 2011, 46.
218 Liu 1956, 109,110.
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their attacks on China, if China were willing to join the alliance which would later become the
Axis. But China did not want to join the “Axis” powers, and Japan did not want China to be an
ally. Instead, Japan’s plan was always to enslave China and capture the entire mainland as its
colony. Once the Nankou Campaign broke out, there was no doubt that China had chosen to
stand with the alliance that would be known as the Allied Powers later.
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Epilogue
Our world today is established on the result of the Second World War, and our knowledge
of its events and its players, some of whom have been discounted in our history and our
consciousness. The way we recognize the war history somehow influences the structure of our
world today. For instance, the permanent members of the UN Security Council, also known as
the Big Five, include five governments: China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom., and the
United States. However, few people today know that China earned his permanent membership
because of the participation and great efforts in the Second World War. That China, as a member
of the Allies during the Second World War and one of the original permanent members of the
UN Security Council, was the Republic of China (ROC), not the People’s Republic (PRC). ROC
was driven to Taiwan province by the Communists and forced to abandon the membership. Thus,
most efforts and achievements in the Asian Theater of World War II have been stolen by the
Communists, and China has become the only country whose efforts are obscured seriously in the
four chief Allied Powers (China, UK, USSR, US). Without correcting the mistakes of the
interpretation of the Asian-Pacific Theater, we do not qualify to claim that we won the Second
World War or to celebrate the so-called “victory” – we defeated the Fascism, but we lost to the
Communism.
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